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SUMMARY
Incorporating sustainability into operational strategies has gained tremendous
momentum among firms. An important driver is the need to comply with environ-
mental legislation that grows in both coverage and stringency. Moreover, many firms
also come to recognize the value of establishing sustainable operations to enhance
profitability, especially with its potential to be scaled up by the rapidly increasing
volume of production and end-of-life products. In this dissertation, I study firms’
sustainable operational strategies either for complying with legislation or for improv-
ing profitability. In the first essay (Chapter II), I point out that, although largely
overlooked by the literature, increasing product durability can be utilized, in addi-
tion to recyclability, as a design lever when a durable product producer is imposed
with the responsibility of end-of-life product management. The analysis reveals that
when trade-off between the two design options exists, legislation can lead to surpris-
ing design outcomes. The second essay (Chapter III) studies the strategies of Testing
and Remanufacturing as instruments for a durable product manufacturer to tackle
the lemons problem. The lemons problem arises in secondary markets as the sellers,
being the original owners of the used products, take advantage of the superior qual-
ity information to strategically sell the low-quality items to the secondary markets
while keeping the high-quality ones. This study reveals the unexplored functionalities
of conducting testing and remanufacturing in resolving the lemons problem, which
take effects through enabling the manufacturer a stronger control over the secondary
markets. The third essay (Chapter IV) builds upon these insights and proposes a
framework to empirically study the effectiveness of the Testing and Remanufacturing




Sustainable operations management is gaining increasing importance for firms to
succeed in the market, both for complying with environmental legislation and for
enhancing profitability in the market. Under the environmental pressure from the
fast-expanding industrial production and the growing public awareness, environmen-
tal legislation with rising stringency is being developed and imposed on a wider scope
of products. Complying with such legislation in an economically efficient way requires
firms to optimally plan for and integrate sustainability into their operations starting
from product design, sales to end-of-life product management. Even in the absence
of legislation, sustainable strategies such as remanufacturing are also embedded with
the potential to help firms improve their market performance. This dissertation stud-
ies sustainable operational strategies both as a way to comply with environmental
legislation and to enhance profitability.
In the first essay (Chapter II), I study durable product producers who are re-
sponsible for the proper treatment of their end-of-life products under the take-back
legislation based on Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR). By assigning producer
responsibility, EPR-based legislation has the potential to not only achieve landfill di-
version, but also incentivize eco-friendly product designs. In this study, I focus on
the product design implications of EPR. In particular, I observe that the design in-
centives under EPR may involve an inherent trade-off that has not been explored to
date: Durable product producers can respond to EPR by making their products either
more recyclable or more durable, where the former will decrease the unit recycling cost
while the latter will reduce the volume of recycling for the producer. When these two
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design attributes do not go hand-in-hand, as is the case for many product categories,
product design implications of EPR can be subtle. I find that seemingly similar EPR
implementation levers, namely recycling and collection targets, may have opposing
effects in driving producers’ design choices. Furthermore, more stringent legislative
targets do not always guarantee improved product recyclability and durability. In
particular, if the objective of EPR is to induce recyclable product designs, a low recy-
cling target accompanied with a high collection target should be used. On the other
hand, if the objective of EPR is to induce durable product designs, a low collection
target accompanied with a high recycling target is more appropriate.
In the second essay (Chapter III), I study how the strategies of Testing and Re-
manufacturing can help resolve the lemons problem arising in the secondary market.
To be specific, used products sold in the secondary market may be of high or low
quality (which will be referred to as “peaches” and “lemons”, respectively) due to
previous usage or deterioration. The quality of any particular product unit is only
known to the seller who originally owns it, but not to the buyers prior to purchase.
Under this asymmetric information, buyers will offer a price that only reflects the av-
erage quality in the market. However, this price will be lower than the fair price of a
peach and higher than that of a lemon. As such, lemon owners are willing to sell while
peach owners prefer to hold. As a consequence of such strategic peach-holding behav-
ior, the secondary market is filled with more lemons than peaches, which lowers the
average market quality. In the literature, trade-in programs offered by manufacturers
have been proposed as remedies. However, even with trade-ins, the lemons problem
is not completely resolved, as the strategic peach-holding behavior still persists and
dilutes the average market quality. In this essay, I show that by conducting testing
or remanufacturing, the manufacturer is able to eliminate the strategic peach-holding
behavior entirely. In that case, the used product sellers no longer take advantage of
the superior quality information they have; and when they sell a used unit, they do so
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regardless of whether they have peaches or lemons. In other words, there will not be
more lemons than peaches in the secondary market and hence the lemons problem is
resolved. Furthermore, I also compare the Testing and Remanufacturing strategies,
and derive a comprehensive guidance on how to choose from these alternative solu-
tions to the lemons problem and how the product characteristics play a role. Building
on these insights from the analytical analysis, in the third essay (Chapter IV), I pro-
pose a framework to empirically study the lemons problem and the effectiveness of
Testing and Remanufacturing, in the context of used automobile markets. I develop




DESIGN IMPLICATIONS OF EXTENDED PRODUCER
RESPONSIBILITY FOR DURABLE PRODUCTS
2.1 Introduction
Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) is a policy concept that requires producers
to operate or finance the management of their end-of-life products through environ-
mentally friendly processes such as recycling. By assigning product end-of-life man-
agement responsibility to producers, EPR legislation is expected to create incentives
for producers to design products with environmentally superior attributes (OECD
2001). In particular, because EPR legislation emphasizes recycling (e.g., the WEEE
Directive specifies recycling rate targets1), it is commonly assumed that it will in-
duce eco-design incentives that are geared towards making products more recyclable
(easier and cheaper to recycle). Yet durable goods producers - and most products
covered under EPR are durable - have an additional lever at their disposal: investing
in durability. In contrast to recyclability that acts on unit cost, durability acts on vol-
ume: A more durable product can be priced higher and sold to fewer customers while
maintaining profitability. Surprisingly, however, a durable good producer’s durabil-
ity choice in response to EPR has received limited attention (see §2.2 for a detailed
discussion). In this paper, we fill this void.
These are timely questions: In recent years, recognizing that most electronic prod-
ucts are durable, durability has emerged as a stated eco-design objective. This is the
case both in Europe and in the US. For example, the Sustainable Production and
1A recycling rate target is defined as the percentage, by weight, of the product that needs to be
recycled.
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Consumption Unit of the European Commission now considers both recyclability
and durability as key eco-design attributes (Misiga 2012). EPR legislation in Rhode
Island states that its purpose is encouraging the design of electronic products that
are more durable and more recyclable (RIDEM 2013). The environmental rationale
on durability is that durability may lead to “source reduction,” the most preferred
form of waste reduction (U.S. EPA 2013), by suppressing new production due to two
effects: life extension and demand response (a more durable product can be priced
higher as described above). However, it is hard to specify a durability target that is
akin in ease of enforcement to a recycling rate or a collection rate target2: This would
require regulating how quickly a product’s market value should depreciate or how
many years a product should last (both of which have been utilized in the literature
as durability measures), neither of which is viable. Therefore, another open question
is: How do recycling and collection rate targets imposed by EPR, especially as they
become more stringent, indirectly affect durability choice? This is another question
this paper seeks to answer.
How recyclability and durability interact matters greatly in this context. On one
hand, they may be synergistic design attributes, i.e., they can be enhanced by simi-
lar design changes. Eichner and Runkel (2003) argue that both attributes positively
correlate with the weight of the product: Cars with thicker aluminum frames are
more durable due to their higher rigidity and more recyclable due to a higher content
of recyclable material. Similarly, a desktop computer with an aluminum casing is
cheaper to recycle and more durable than one with a plastic casing (HP 2009). On
the other hand, these two attributes may conflict, as in the following examples: Using
screws rather than adhesives increases durability because screws are more chemically
stable and withstand heat better, but this increases the recycling cost (i.e., reduces
2A collection rate target is defined as the proportion of total product volume sold that needs to
be collected for recycling.
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recyclability) as screws require labor for disassembly (Bonnington 2014). Apple re-
placed PVC by TPE in the sheathings of its new generation lightning cables. These
cables are more recyclable yet less durable because TPE is softer (Apple 2015). NiMH
batteries are more recyclable than NiCd batteries because they contain more nickel.
However, NiMH batteries can be recharged fewer times than the NiCd batteries, i.e.,
they are much less durable (Langrova 2002).
Photovoltaic Panels (PVPs), which have recently been added to the scope of the
WEEE Directive, exhibit a similar durability-recyclability trade-off in multiple design
dimensions. For PVPs, choosing the main technology for the photovoltaic cells is an
important design decision. Currently, the two most prevalent alternatives that are
mature enough for commercial use are crystalline silicon (c-Si) and thin-film tech-
nologies. In general, the thin-film PVPs are more recyclable than the c-Si PVPs
because the thin-film panels contain precious rare metals such as indium and gallium,
which can be recovered by recycling and have positive recycling value. However, a
c-Si PVP outperforms a thin-film-based one in product durability because it has a
lower degradation rate (Jordan and Kurtz 2012). To be more specific, PVPs bring
value to consumers by converting sunlight into electric power, so when the efficiency
of this functionality depreciates more slowly, as reflected by a lower degradation rate,
it means the products are more durable. The trade-off between recyclability and
durability exists in determining the build of PVPs as well. A frameless PVP struc-
ture facilitates recycling due to easier disassembly, but may compromise the durability
when compared to a framed design (Besiou and Wassenhove 2015). One reason is that
frameless PVPs are more vulnerable to damage, especially in a dusty or humid envi-
ronment. Moreover, the glass-glass frameless PVP modules have a higher degradation
rate than the glass-polymer framed modules, which indicates lower durability (Jor-
dan and Kurtz 2012). Finally, the design decision on the encapsulant material (which
is a layer of adhesive in PVPs) may also involve a durability-recyclability trade-off.
6
Silicone encapsulants are less recyclable than EVA-based encapsulants (NovoPoly-
mers 2015) but are more durable as they are more resistant to discoloration-based
deterioration.
In this paper, we develop a model to shed light on a durable good producer’s choice
of durability and recyclability under EPR when these two design attributes interact.
In particular, we focus on EPR legislation imposing recycling and collection targets,
inspired by the WEEE Directive of the European Commission (Europa-Environment
2012), probably the most influential EPR legislation to date, covering 27 countries
in Europe for the majority of electrical and electronic equipment categories. We
first derive a cornerstone technical result: a joint closed-form characterization of the
optimal recyclability and durability choices. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
first paper to provide structural results about the durability-recyclability interaction
by endogenizing durability choice in a market subject to EPR.
We leverage this characterization to derive a number of managerial insights. When
recyclability and durability are synergistic design attributes, a more stringent recy-
cling rate target indeed leads to the most favorable design outcome: a product that
is more recyclable and durable. However, a producer’s design choices can be quite
counter-intuitive when the two attributes conflict (as in the above examples). Rel-
atively low recycling targets work as intended, i.e., durable goods producers should
design for recyclability, but this may come at the expense of durability. However, fur-
ther increases in recycling targets may drive producers to switch to designing more
durable products at the expense of recyclability. This effect is even stronger for
producers with higher profit margins.
Furthermore, a similar analysis of the collection targets reveals that seemingly
similar EPR implementation levers have very different effects on a durable good pro-
ducer’s design choices. Collection targets have the complete opposite effect compared
to the recycling targets: Relatively low collection targets imply that durable goods
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producers should design for durability, which helps reduce collection volume obliga-
tions by reducing sales volume, but this may come at the expense of lower recyclability.
Interestingly, further increases in collection targets may drive producers to switch to
designing more recyclable, yet less durable products despite the increased collection
volume obligations this strategy may imply. This effect is further strengthened when
recycling a unit is profitable and implies a competitive market for access to end-of-
life products. In that case, a durable good producer always designs more recyclable
but less durable products as collection targets become more stringent. We show that
under some conditions, the emphasis on lower durability in response to stringent
collection targets translates to increased production and disposal volumes.
We conclude that implicit assumptions on EPR-driven product design changes
may not necessarily hold in durable goods markets. In particular, a stricter recycling
target does not necessarily translate to a more recyclable product. Interestingly, there
are some instances where higher durability may be observed without directly targeting
durability. Moreover, depending on the economics of recycling, the collection rate
lever can work in different ways. The policy implication is that in durable goods
markets, the design outcomes associated with different EPR implementation levers
such as collection and recycling targets (and their stringency level choices) should be
carefully evaluated and these policy tools should be adapted to the product category.
To demonstrate how the implications of chosen policy levers on product design
can be analyzed, we perform a calibrated numerical study for PVPs, a product cat-
egory that was recently added in the WEEE Directive Recast and that faces clear
trade-offs between recyclability and durability as explained above. The set-up of the
WEEE Directive is especially interesting for our analysis, as its recent recast (Europa-
Environment 2012) calls for collection and recycling targets to become more stringent
over time. We focus on the design trade-off in the choice between c-Si and thin-film
technologies for the PV cells. Using real market data and expert input from the
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PVP industry, our analysis allows us to investigate the implications of the WEEE
Directive Recast on PVP producers’ technology choice, illustrating the advantages
and pitfalls of EPR on design for the environment. This analysis demonstrates the
importance of not using uniform legislative targets regarding recycling and collection
rates for all product categories, but rather adapting these targets to product and
market characteristics and environmental impact priorities.
2.2 Literature Review
This work draws on and contributes to EPR-related research at the interface of op-
erations management and environmental economics. Environmental economists have
long studied the economic and environmental implications of EPR, particularly to
analyze and compare the efficiency of different EPR policy instruments. Among
those are (i) financial instruments such as production taxes, advance recycling fees,
and refunds (see Turner and Pearce 1994, for a discussion); (ii) information- based
instruments, e.g., labeling requirements mandating producers to display the envi-
ronmental characteristics of their products (Lindqvist 2000); and (iii) administrative
instruments, in the form of requirements imposed on producers, such as product take-
back mandates (Lee 2002, Toffel 2003). See Callcott and Walls (2002), Eichner and
Pething (2001), Fullerton and Wu (1998) and Dinan (1993) for further discussion as
to how these different policy instruments compare.
We differ from this stream of research by our operational focus, i.e., we provide
a detailed analysis of design choices under product take-back mandates (which are
prevalent for a variety of reasons; see Atasu and Van Wassenhove 2010, for a detailed
discussion) in the presence of a durability-recyclability trade-off in design. Focus-
ing on operational questions has proven useful in studying various issues regarding
environmentally sustainable practices in business (see Guide and Van Wassenhove
2007, Atasu et al. 2008, Ferguson and Souza 2010, for reviews). Studies in this vein
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include (i) reverse logistics for used or recovered products (Fleischmann et al. 2001,
De Brito and Dekker 2004, Savaskan et al. 2004); (ii) inventory management with
remanufactured products (Toktay et al. 2000, DeCroix 2006); (iii) consumer returns
management (Guide et al. 2006, Ferguson et al. 2006); (vi) joint management of new
and remanufacturered products in the market (Debo et al. 2005, Tereyagoglu et al.
2015); (v) sustainability of different business models (Agrawal et al. 2012, Ulku et al.
2012); and (vi) sustainable production via responsible sourcing by producers (Kraft et
al. 2013, Kraft and Raz 2015) or by suppliers (Agrawal and Lee 2015). In particular,
we contribute to the recent operations management literature investigating the impli-
cations of environmental legislation in different operational settings. Related research
covers topics including (i) the effect of disclosure mandates on producers’ efforts to
evaluate their environmental impacts (Kalkanci et al. 2015); (ii) the effect of emis-
sion legislation on carbon leakage (Islegen and Reichelstein 2011, Drake 2012); and
(iii) the effect of consumer subsidies or environmental taxes on the adoption of green
technologies (Cohen et al. 2015, Chamama et al. 2015, Krass et al. 2013). Recent
research that shares our focus on EPR legislation includes (i) the effect of incorpo-
rating reuse targets in EPR on remanufacturing and the environment (Karakayali
et al. 2015, Esenduran et al. 2014); (ii) the effect of collection and recycling cost
structures and competition on the efficiency of EPR (Atasu et al. 2009, Toyasaki
et al. 2011) and different stakeholders’ perspectives (Atasu et al. 2012); (iii) cost
allocation in collective EPR implementations considering network-based operations
(Gui et al. 2015) and exogenous cost sharing mechanisms (Atasu and Subramanian
2012, Jacobs and Subramanian 2011); (iv) the effect of secondary market interference
practices (Alev et al. 2014); and (v) the effect of EPR on producers’ new product
introduction decisions (Plambeck and Wang 2009) and product design choices (Atasu
and Subramanian 2012, Subramanian et al. 2009, Atasu and Souza 2012, Raz et al.
2015, Esenduran and Kemahlioglu-Ziya 2015, Esenduran et al. 2015, to name a few).
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Our work is closely related to the last group of papers that explore the product design
implications of EPR. Yet, to the best of our knowledge, none of these study EPR-
driven design changes for durable products, or the associated durability-recyclability
trade-off.
Our consideration of the design decisions on both recyclability and durability
attributes has commonalities with new product development research that involves
design with respect to multiple quality dimensions (Lacourbe et al. 2009, Chen 2001,
Krishnan and Zhu 2006, Kim and Chhajed 2002, Chambers et al. 2006). We con-
tribute to this stream by integrating a general model of design interactions in a durable
goods setting to study the influence of EPR legislation on eco-design attributes. Our
work also contributes to research in the durable goods literature (cf. Waldman 2003
for a comprehensive review) that analyzes a producer’s pricing and design decisions
(see Coase 1972, Bulow 1982, 1986, Kim 1989, Choi 1994, Waldman 1996, Hendel
and Lizzeri 1999, Huang et al. 2001, Agrawal et al. 2012, 2015). To the best of our
knowledge, the effect of EPR on a producer’s product durability choice has not been
studied to date and our results show that the effect of EPR can be quite nuanced.
2.3 Model
In this section we build a discrete-time, infinite-horizon model to analyze the implica-
tions of EPR on a durable good producer that designs its product for durability and
recyclability. Periods are indexed by t ≥ 0 and the timeline of events is as follows. At
period t = 0, a legislator announces the EPR obligations imposed on the producer.
Given the EPR obligations, the producer determines its product design, namely the
durability and recyclability of the product. In each subsequent period t > 0, the
producer sets its new product sales price pt, recycles a portion of end-of-life prod-
ucts arising from past sales, and consumers make purchasing decisions given product
durability and price.
11
Below, we first describe the assumptions regarding our market equilibrium analysis
for t > 0, and characterize the demand. After that, we describe the model assump-
tions regarding the producer’s product design decisions under EPR, which helps us
formulate the producer’s objective.
2.3.1 Demand Characterization
We consider a discrete-time, infinite-horizon, sequential game between a producer
selling a single durable product and consumers, given a product with durability δ ∈
[0, 1] and recyclability ρ ≥ 0. We assume that the product of interest has a two-
period lifetime (Desai and Purohit 1998, Huang et al. 2001, Hendel and Lizzeri 1999,
Agrawal et al. 2015). A product can be in one of three states during its lifetime: new
during the first period of use, used during the second period of use, and end-of-life
after two periods of use. We assume it still provides consumer utility after one period
of use, but none after two periods of use.
The market size remains constant in each period t. Each consumer uses at most
one unit of product at any time. Without loss of generality, we normalize the market
size to a unit mass of customers indexed by their type θ. To capture market hetero-
geneity, we assume θ is uniformly distributed in [0, 1]. A consumer type θ obtains a
gross utility of θ and δθ from using new and used products for a period, respectively,
where product durability is denoted by δ and represents the relative value of a used
product compared to a new one, implying a depreciation or value loss after use that
is typical for durable products. At the end of every period, consumers who own a
product that still has useful life left may choose to sell the used product on the sec-
ondary market at the market-clearing price ptu
.
= ptu(p
t) and purchase a new one. In
analyzing the game between the producer and the consumers, we focus our analysis
on stationary equilibria, where the price stays constant in time (Hendel and Lizzeri
1999, Huang et al. 2001, Plambeck and Wang 2009, Agrawal et al. 2015); i.e., pt = p
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and ptu = pu. This rules out transient effects due to only new products being present
in the first period.
We assume that the consumers are forward looking. We also assume that all infor-
mation regarding the cost structures and preferences is common knowledge, and all
players have a common discount factor γ. Given the two-period lifetime of a product,
we need only focus on two-period customer strategies. Moreover, the consumer utility
from holding on to the product after using it for one period is equivalent to selling
the one-period-old product at that point and buying a used one on the secondary
market (cf. Appendix A.1 of Agrawal et al. 2015). Therefore, under stationarity, the
per-period net utility from purchasing a new product is θ − p + γpu, that from pur-
chasing a used product is δθ−pu and that from remaining inactive is 0. Furthermore,
the net utility from these actions is independent of the consumer’s past actions. Con-
sequently, there are only three undominated consumer strategies: buy new products
in every period (Bn), buy used products in every period (Bu), and always remain
inactive (RI); see also Hendel and Lizzeri (1999a), pp. 1099-1100 for an intuitive ex-
planation of this. The per-period utilities of consumers choosing these undominated
strategies are denoted by: V [Bn, θ] = θ−p+γpu, V [Bu, θ] = δθ−pu and V [RI, θ] = 0,
respectively. The differences V [Bn, θ]−V [Bu, θ] and V [Bu, θ]−V [RI, θ] are increas-
ing functions in θ. Therefore, there exist θ1, θ2 ∈ [0, 1] such that consumers of type
θ ∈ (θ1, 1] choose Bn, those of type θ ∈ (θ2, θ1] choose Bu and all others remain inac-
tive. Then the demand for new products, q(p, δ), can be written as q = 1−θ1 and the
secondary market clearing price pu can be obtained by solving θ2 − θ1 = 1 − θ1. This






and q = 1 − θ1 = 1+γδ−p1+δ+2γδ . For simplicity,
we take γ = 1 in the remaining of the paper, i.e., q = 1 − θ1 = 1+δ−p1+3δ .
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2.3.2 Design Choices
We model the EPR obligations based on the WEEE Directive implementations in
Europe, and consider a collection rate target λ ∈ [0, 1] and a recycling rate target
R ∈ [0, 1] imposed on the producer (see §2.5.3 for a discussion on other forms of EPR
implementation). We assume that the collection rate target requires the producer to
collect a minimum λ fraction of all end-of-life products, mimicking the WEEE Direc-
tive that specifies a percentage of total products put on the market that producers
are required to collect (DBIS 2012). The recycling rate target requires the producer
to recycle at least R percentage (by weight) of each unit of product collected. This
modeling choice also follows from the recycling rates of the WEEE Directive that
are defined in terms of the percentage by weight per appliance, which can vary from
50% − 80% depending on product category (Europa-Environment 2010).
The recycling rate target directly influences the economics of recycling: End-of-life
products consist of parts that have different recycling value, and recycling typically
concentrates on the parts that have the highest value. For example, cellphone recy-
cling focuses on harvesting the precious metal used in the circuit boards and soldering,
such as gold, silver and copper. As the recycling percentage of a cellphone increases,
recycling extends to also include the pure handset casings and then the mixed plas-
tics, which have lower recycling value (Mobile Muster 2015). Similarly, for a desktop
computer, the CPUs, memory cards, and motherboards are usually the components
that recycling focuses on due to their precious metal content and hence higher value.
If a higher recycling rate is desired from the item, then the less valuable parts such
as the wires, aluminum heat sink or even the plastic casings will be recycled (SMF
2012). Therefore, for recycling every unit of product, the marginal recycling value
(denoted as f(r)) can be represented as a non-increasing step function in the recy-
cling level (denoted as r and r ∈ [0, 1]), with the steps corresponding to different
materials/components of the product. f(r) can also be negative for certain values of
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r, which indicates a cost incurred to recycle some parts of the product. This can be
the case for products such as CRT monitors: While the yoke and circuit boards have
positive recycling value, the leaded glass imposes a cost (MRI 2014). We approxi-
mate this relation by a linear function and let f(r) = α − βr. Here, α represents
the marginal recycling value from the most valuable parts (such as the gold from
cellphones, or the CPUs from desktop computers). β represents the degree to which
the marginal recycling value drops as the recycling level increases, for example, β for
CRT monitors may be large because when the level of recycling rises from only includ-
ing the yoke (with valuable materials) to also including the leaded glass components
(costly to process), the marginal recycling value drops dramatically. In the absence
of a given recycling target being specified by EPR legislation, the profit-maximizing
producer would optimally only recycle the parts of each product unit that generate
positive marginal recycling value. In other words, r∗ = min{1,max{0, r}}, where r
solves f(r) = 0, and the unit recycling value, i.e., the total recycling value obtained
from one unit at the chosen recycling rate, equals
∫ r∗
0
(α − βφ)dφ. If the recycling
rate target enforced by EPR is more stringent (R > r∗), the producer is mandated to
recycle some parts that do not generate positive marginal recycling value and the unit
recycling value obtained (
∫ R
0
(α− βφ)dφ) would be lower and could even be negative.
To lower the unit economic burden associated with mandated recycling, the pro-
ducer can design for recyclability. For instance, when products are designed for
ease-of-disassembly or use more recyclable materials, the unit recycling value will be
higher. To model such design improvements for recyclability (denoted by ρ) in a
tractable manner, we assume that the marginal recycling value at any recycling level
increases by ρ. In other words, f(r, ρ) = α + ρ − βr. As such, for a given recycling




(α+ ρ− βφ)dφ = −1
2
βr2 + (α+ ρ)r (which can be negative). For a given
collection target λ, this implies an effective unit recycling value of λv(r, ρ).
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Alternatively, a producer subject to EPR legislation can design for durability,
which we assume is equivalent to choosing δ. Increasing durability implies a higher
consumer utility from buying new products. Therefore, it enables the producer to
price the products higher and sell a smaller quantity, resulting in fewer end-of-life
products and hence a smaller volume of products to recycle. This reduces the cost of
complying with EPR legislation.
The producer’s design decisions on durability (δ) and recyclability (ρ) influence
the production costs. To capture this, we assume that a product that is non-durable
and non-recyclable can be produced at cost m > 0 per unit, and that the cost of
producing a unit of product with durability δ and recyclability ρ is given by g(ρ, δ) =
m + τρ2 + bδ2 + dρδ, where τ, b ≥ 03.
This formulation considers durability and recyclability as different quality dimen-
sions as in Krishnan and Zhu (2006). The coefficients τ and b reflect the rate of
cost increase driven by the relevant design attribute, and the associated terms are
quadratic to reflect decreasing returns in these design attributes (Purohit 1994, Atasu
and Subramanian 2012). The last term in this formulation captures the possible in-
teraction between recyclability and durability choices in product design (paralleling
Krishnan and Zhu 2006). When the two attributes are synergistic as in the example of
thick aluminum panels in cars, or of metal in desktop computer casings, d < 0. How-
ever, when there is a trade-off between durability and recyclability as in the example
of PVPs, d > 0, reflecting a higher cost to realize improvements in both attributes.
2.4 The Equilibrium Characterization
Following the stationary demand characterization provided in §2.3.1, we assume that
the producer maximizes its per-period profit in steady state. Given the sequential na-
ture of the model, we solve the producer’s profit maximization problem by backward
3Any collection (cc) and recycling cost (cp) that is incurred at a unit level (independent of
recycling rate) can be captured by adjusting the unit production cost by λ(cc + cp).
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induction: Let Π(p, r; ρ, δ) = q(p, δ) · (p − g(ρ, δ) + λv(r, ρ)) denote the producer’s
per-period steady-state profit given durability δ and recyclability ρ, and the associ-
ated recycling, collection and production costs provided in §2.3.2 under a mandated
collection rate λ (which we assume to be binding due to costly recycling or com-
petition for profitable recycling; both cases are discussed in §2.5.2). We first solve
maxp,r Π(p, r; ρ, δ) subject to r ≥ R in steady state. Let Π∗(ρ, δ) denote the solu-
tion to this problem. Then, the producer’s design problem can be formulated as
maxρ,δ Π
∗(ρ, δ).
Substituting previously derived expressions into the profit function, we obtain:
Π(p, r; ρ, δ) =
(
1 + δ − p
1 + 3δ
)(






Lemma 2.1 characterizes the producer’s recycling level and pricing decisions as well
as the resulting demand in steady state for given (ρ, δ). In our analysis, we assume
2βτ > λ so that (A1) is jointly concave with respect to (ρ, r). We also restrict the
analysis to parameters (m, τ, b, d, α, β) where for at least some values of (ρ, δ, r, λ),
the unit profit margin is non-negative and the unit recycling value is lower than the
unit production cost. All proofs are provided in the Appendix.
Lemma 2.1 Given a product design with ρ and δ, the optimal recycling level r∗(ρ, δ)
and the new product price p∗(ρ, δ) can be summarized as follows. When α+ρ
β
≤ R,
r∗(ρ, δ) = R; when R < α+ρ
β
< 1, r∗(δ, ρ) = α+ρ
β
; and when 1 ≤ α+ρ
β
, r∗(δ, ρ) = 1.
The optimal price p∗(ρ, δ) = 1
2
(





The corresponding new product demand is q(p∗(δ, ρ), δ) = 1
2(1+3δ)
(
1 + δ − g(ρ, δ)+





Lemma 2.1 identifies three recycling scenarios that will be observed in equilibrium,
which map well to the range of recycling choices in practice. The first case (i.e.,
r∗ = R) represents scenarios where voluntary recycling is not profitable enough and
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hence the recycling target is binding at optimality. This outcome represents the
case of regulated markets for most electronics, either due to low recycling margins
(α is small) as in the case of fluorescent lamps, or a quick drop in the marginal
recycling value when the recycling level increases (β is high) as is typical in CRT
recycling. The second case, r∗ = α+ρ
β
, represents voluntary (and partial) recycling
beyond compliance requirements, which represents the case of the car industry subject
to legislation such as the End of Life Vehicles Directive, where voluntary recycling has
reportedly exceeded the compliance requirement levels (Smink 2006). Finally, the last
case with full recycling, i.e., r∗ = 1, represents markets for valuable commodities such
as aluminum cans. Given this characterization of the producer’s optimal recycling
and pricing decisions for a given design profile, we next investigate the producer’s
design choices.
To build intuition as to the producer’s design choices, we first start with a simple
benchmark scenario that ignores the possible design interactions between durability
and recyclability, i.e., we assume d = 0. Proposition 2.2 presents the producer’s
recyclability choice for a given durability level.
Proposition 2.2 Let d = 0. The optimal recyclability choice (and the corresponding
optimal recycling level) can be summarized as follows. When α ≤ R(β− λ
2τ
), ρ∗ = Rλ
2τ
and r∗ = R; when R(β − λ
2τ
) < α < β − λ
2τ
, ρ∗ = αλ
2βτ−λ





≤ α, ρ∗ = λ
2τ
and r∗ = 1.
Proposition 2.2 states that in the absence of a durability-recyclability interaction,
the recyclability choice of the producer will be primarily driven by the baseline re-
cycling value α, which is a measure of recycling benefits that can be obtained from
recycling in the absence of design for recyclability. Two intuitive observations from
this proposition are that (i) as α increases, the recyclability choice of the producer
will increase and (ii) the recycling target will be binding only if α is sufficiently low.
Moreover, ρ∗ does not depend on δ, the durability level of the product: In the absence
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of the design interaction, the choice of recyclability boils down to minimizing the unit
cost subject to the recycling target requirement.
Given this observation, we next characterize the producer’s optimal durability
choice. The analysis reveals that the unit profit margin of a non-durable product
at its optimal recyclability level is key; we call this quantity A4. A increases when
the product has a higher recycling value potential (higher α or lower β), or a lower
production cost (m). In turn, given A, the producer’s profit for a given δ can be
written as Π(δ) = 1
4(1+3δ)
(δ−bδ2+A)2 (see Lemma 2 in the Appendix for a derivation),
which leads us to one of the important technical results in this paper.














. The optimal durabil-
ity choice of the producer is characterized as follows: When 0 ≤ b < 1
5
, then δ∗ = 1
if A < 1 − b and 0 otherwise; when 1
5
≤ b < 5
13
, then δ∗ = 1 if A < A(b), δ∗ = δint if
A(b) ≤ A < Â(b), and δ∗ = 0 otherwise; and when 5
13
≤ b, then δ∗ = δint if A < Â(b),
and 0 otherwise.
Figure 1: The optimal durability δ∗ as a function of A and b.
Proposition 2.3 characterizes the optimal durability choice of the producer in the
4Following Proposition 2.2, A is given by 1 −m + λ(Rα − 2βτ−λ4τ R2), 1 −m + α
2τλ
2βτ−λ , 1 −m +
λ(α− 2βτ−λ4τ ) for the three cases represented in equilibrium, respectively.
19
absence of the durability-recyclability interaction in design, which is illustrated in Fig-
ure 1: The optimal durability choice of the producer simply depends on the marginal
cost of designing for durability (b), and the unit profit margin for a non-durable
product (evaluated at the optimal recyclability level). In essence, a large unit profit
margin from a non-durable product (i.e., high A) implies that the producer would like
to sell as many of those products as possible. Hence, the larger the A, the lower the
optimal durability choice of the producer. Note that a number of factors determine
the magnitude of A: In particular, a higher recycling target R (weakly) reduces A -
that is, more stringent recycling targets will lead the producer to design equally or
more durable products. In contrast, a large α, or a low β and m imply a larger A,
meaning that products that are inherently easier to recycle and cheaper to produce
will be subject to design for product obsolescence (low durability), irrespective of the
directional improvement achieved by more stringent recycling targets. To the best of
our knowledge, this is the first closed-form characterization of a producer’s durability
choice, jointly considering the implications of EPR and markets for durable goods (i.e.,
the interaction between new product sales and secondary markets), which advances
our understanding of the interactions between EPR and durable goods markets. It
also lays the foundation for analyzing the design interaction we focus on, which is
investigated next.
We now turn to the case of a non-zero interaction term d 6= 0. While omitted
here for brevity, we first prove a result paralleling Proposition 2.2 to characterize the
optimal recyclability choice in this case (see Lemma 3 in the Appendix for details).
Proposition 2.4 then characterizes the optimal durability choice.






2 ∀d, defined by a set of Fj, bj and Aj (detailed in the Appendix). The







Proposition 2.4 essentially states that the optimal durability characterization in
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the presence of a non-zero interaction term d 6= 0 follows from the characterization in
Proposition 2.3 with d = 0. The only difference is that depending on the value d, there
exist sets of mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive cases with corresponding
expressions of Fj, bj and Aj such that the producer’s profit Π(δ) is fully characterized
by a high-order polynomial. Yet the characterization of the optimal δ within each
case j (denoted as δ∗j ) is identical to that in Proposition 2.3, and the globally optimal
unique δ∗ is easily obtained by a profit comparison across those cases. The significance
of this result is that it provides us with a closed-form solution that allows us to analyze
the implications of EPR on the design of durable products, which we investigate in
detail in the next section.
2.5 The Effect of EPR on the Design of Durable Products
We are now poised to answer the core research questions posed in this paper by
investigating how the recycling and collection targets affect the producer’s design
choices. We start with the simpler case of a synergistic design interaction.
Proposition 2.5 When d ≤ 0, the optimal durability and recyclability choices are
(weakly) increasing in the recycling target R and the collection target λ.
When there is a synergistic design interaction between durability and recyclability
choices (e.g., as in desktop computers), an increase in the recycling and collection
targets (R and λ) leads to a simultaneous increase in recyclability and durability:
More stringent recycling or collection targets naturally generate a positive impetus for
increasing ρ∗ and δ∗ because when higher collection and recycling levels are mandated,
the former increases the marginal recycling value, whereas the latter helps reduce the
sales volume and hence the volume of recycling.
The same intuition however, does not hold when the two attributes are conflicting
in design (as in the examples provided in the introduction), i.e., when d > 0. Ac-
cordingly, in what follows, we focus our attention to d > 0. We further focus on the
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case where the recycling target is binding (i.e., r∗ = R) in equilibrium, which allows
us to focus on legislation-induced design choices. To derive the key insights while
keeping the analysis concise, we assume b = τ , i.e., the costs of improving the two
attributes are comparable. We first analyze the effect of the recycling target R, and
then analyze the same for the collection target λ.
2.5.1 Recycling Targets
Proposition 2.6 When d > 0, ∃ Rdl, Rd, where 0 ≤ Rdl ≤ Rd ≤ 1 such that the
optimal durability δ∗ decreases if R ∈ [Rdl, Rd] and (weakly) increases otherwise.
Proposition 2.6 provides an important result regarding the directional impact of
the recycling target R on the producer’s choice of product durability. In particular,
this result reveals that the durability choice is non-monotonic in the recycling target
when d > 0, and that there exists a range of the recycling target in which an increase
in R implies reduced durability. This result can be explained by analyzing the effect
of R on the recyclability choice and its interaction with the durability level, which is
explored in the next proposition and illustrated in Figure 2.
Proposition 2.7 When d > 0, (i) ∃ Rr, Rrr where 0 ≤ Rr ≤ Rrr ≤ 1 and d ≥ 0, such
that the optimal recyclability is decreasing if R ∈ [Rr, Rrr] and (weakly) increasing
otherwise; (ii)Rrr = 1 when d > d; and (iii) Rd ≤ Rr, with Rd = Rr when m ≤ m.
The first part of Proposition 2.7 says that the effect of R on the producer’s recy-
clability choice is also non-monotonic. That is, there exists a range of R for which
increasing R may reduce the producer’s recyclability choice. Furthermore, the second
part of the proposition states that when the design trade-off is critical (i.e., d > d),
ρ∗ decreases over the entire range [Rrr, 1]. The last part of the proposition states
that when the marginal production cost of a (non-recyclable, non-durable) product
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Figure 2: A sketch of the effect of R on δ∗ and ρ∗ when d > d and m ≤ m.
is sufficiently small, the range where the recyclability of a product goes down per-
fectly coincides with the range where the product durability increases. In sum, this
proposition clarifies the design dependency we explore under EPR as follows:
When there is a conflict between the two design options, design improvements
will need to concentrate more heavily on the attribute that more effectively eases the
economic burden of recycling obligations, but the effectiveness of each design option
heavily depends on the chosen recycling targets. Propositions 2.6 and 2.7 explain the
resolution to the design trade-off as follows (illustrated in Figure 2 for the parameter
range in which the design trade-off is most influential): At low R levels (i.e., R
remains below Rdl), an increase in R implies increased durability only (ρ
∗ = 0). This
happens because at low values of R, the marginal value of making the product more
recyclable is lower than the same at high values of R (∂
2v(R,ρ)
∂ρ∂R
> 0). Therefore, when
R ≤ Rdl, the producer relies on increasing durability alone. Beyond (R > Rdl),
however, the marginal value of recyclability is more substantial, and the producer
starts investing in recyclability. Given the design interaction, this makes durability
expensive to maintain. Thus, the producer reduces product durability. This trend
continues only up to a certain point (Rr), beyond which the cost of making the
product more recyclable implies a narrow profit margin, and the producer instead
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invests in increasing durability so as to increase the product price and hence the unit
margin. An additional benefit of increasing durability is reducing the sales volume,
and hence the total cost associated with recycling. Because of the design interaction
in cost, the producer starts decreasing the product recyclability once R goes beyond
this threshold. The key conclusion from this analysis is that very stringent recycling
targets do not necessarily imply the highest levels of recyclability; rather they will
drive the producer towards more durable but less recyclable designs.
In sum, the non-monotonicity of ρ∗ and δ∗ with respect to the recycling target
implies that legislation that aims to promote easier recycling cannot assume higher
recycling targets will drive producers towards more recyclable designs. Rather, in
the presence of a design trade-off between durability and recyclability, producers may
opt for durability improvement at the expense of diminished recyclability. Inducing
durable goods producers to maximize the recyclability of their products may im-
ply imposing rather conservative recycling targets. This however, may come at the
expense of reducing product durability, i.e., design for obsolescence.
2.5.2 Collection Targets
We next investigate the implications of a binding collection target on the producer’s
design choices. In doing so, we distinguish between two scenarios: costly and prof-
itable recycling. We first focus our analysis on v(R, 0) ≤ 0, i.e., recycling is costly. We
then consider the implications of profitable recycling for v(R, 0) > 0, under which the
producer needs to compete with third parties to gain access to end-of-life products
with recoverable value. As before, we focus our analysis on cases where the recycling
target is binding.
2.5.2.1 Costly Recycling
Proposition 2.8 When d > 0, ∃λd ≥ 0 such that the optimal durability is decreasing
if λ ≥ λd, and (weakly) increasing otherwise.
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Proposition 2.8 states that the producer’s durability choice is non-monotonic in the
collection rate target as well. While the non-monotonicity is similar to the situation
with the recycling rate target, interestingly the collection target’s effect on the design
choices of interest is reversed. In particular, very stringent collection targets can
backfire and drive the producer to design products with lower durability. As before,
this effect is driven by the conflict between recyclability and durability, which can be
further clarified with the help of Proposition 2.9 below.
Proposition 2.9 When d > 0, ∃λrl, λr such that 0 ≤ λrl ≤ λr ≤ 1 and the optimal
recyclability choice is decreasing in λ ∈ [λrl, λr], and (weakly) increasing otherwise.
Furthermore, λr ≤ λd.
Similar to the earlier discussion on the recycling rate targets, the presence of the
design trade-off may render simultaneous increase in recyclability and durability too
costly. As such, the producer needs to rely more on one lever than the other. Propo-
sitions 2.8 and 2.9 collectively resolve the design trade-off under the collection rate
target as follows: At a low collection target λ, the producer utilizes the durability
lever first as it has a direct impact on the sales volume and hence the collection vol-
ume (i.e., a more durable product sells at a higher price and leads to a lower sales
volume), and reduces the product recyclability. When the collection rate target goes
beyond a certain threshold (λr) though, the marginal benefit of increased durability
starts shrinking and the producer starts designing for recyclability as well. When the
collection rate further increases beyond a certain threshold (λd), the benefit from re-
cyclability dominates the same from durability, as recyclability increases the recycling
value for each unit of the higher collected volume. Therefore, the producer chooses
more recyclable but less durable product designs.
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2.5.2.2 Profitable Recycling and Competition for Valuable Waste
When the inherent recyclability in a product is sufficiently high (e.g., α is large
enough) or a binding recycling rate target maintains a net profit from recycling in a
regulated market (i.e., v(R, 0) > 0), we need to consider an important phenomenon:
competition for cores (i.e., end-of-life products) by third parties who are attracted
to the collection and recycling market (see Esenduran et al. 2015 for a detailed
discussion). For example, the removal of toxic materials from batteries led to a
flourishing battery recycling industry involving a large number of third-party recyclers
(BU 2015). In the remainder of this section, we analyze recyclability and durability
choices under such third-party competition.
Since EPR requires only the producer to collect λ portion of end-of-life products
for recycling (Esenduran et al. 2015), we first need to analyze the implications of
competition with independent third parties, based on which we can study the impli-
cations of λ on the design decisions of durability and recyclability when waste has
value. To model such competition, we consider the existence of n independent for-
profit third parties in the collection and recycling market along with the producer.
The third parties and the producer pay buyback prices to consumers for returning
end-of-life products to their recycling facilities. We assume that the producer, facing
the product end-of-life obligation, has built enough capacity to accept and recycle
any returns that arrive. In contrast, the capacities of the individual third parties
are limited. Yet without loss of generality, we assume that in equilibrium there is
sufficient aggregate third-party capacity to cover the whole collection and recycling
volume. (We also study more restrictive values of total third-party capacity in the
Appendix, and we show that all the major insights remain robust.) We also assume
that the unit recycling value extractable by the third parties from each returned unit,
denoted by w, will be lower than that for the producer. This could be due to such
factors as not having the best adapted technology or not being familiar with the
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design specifications.
To capture the effect of the collection target on the competition and the buyback
prices, we construct a model similar to the one in Arnold (2001). To adapt the model
to our setting, we consider that when consumers are faced with this capacitated
market, they perform a random search among the producer and all the third parties
to decide where to return the core. In every search attempt, the consumer incurs
a cost s (which can be regarded as a search or delivery cost). When the consumer
encounters a third party that is currently out of capacity, another search (along with
the associated cost) is needed, until the core is accepted for a buyback payment. In
this case, with third parties who set their buyback prices for profit maximization,
we derive the buyback price for the producer to secure the collection rate of λ to be
pλ = w − s((2 − λ)2 − 1) (see details in the Appendix).
With a binding collection target λ for the producer and the corresponding buyback




Comparing this to the demand in §2.3.1, the change in demand is due to consumers’
anticipation that each product will generate an expected net extra value pλ−s at the
end-of-life when returned for recycling. Then the producer maximizes the following
profit by determining the recyclability and durability in the design stage, and then
setting the market price and the actual recycling level:
Π(p, r; ρ, δ) = −(1 + δ)− p+ (pλ − s)
1 + 3δ
(
p− (m+ τρ2 + dρδ + bδ2) + λ(−1
2
βr2 + (α+ ρ)r − pλ)
)
.
We analyze this problem following a similar procedure as discussed in previous sec-
tions. The next proposition sheds light on the design incentives created by the col-
lection target.
Proposition 2.10 When v(R, 0) > 0 and d > 0, ρ∗ is (weakly) increasing and δ∗ is
(weakly) decreasing in λ.
Proposition 2.10 suggests that improving recyclability in a competitive market
in fact may have an additional benefit because of the following: As before, when
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making the decisions on recyclability and durability to deal with the EPR obligation,
the producer is essentially comparing the marginal benefits of the two attributes,
while controlling the associated cost. First, to meet a higher collection target, the
producer is also retaining a larger percentage of the marginal return from improving
recyclability, hence it is profitable to invest more on recyclability. Meanwhile, a
higher ρ∗ creates a pressure to compromise durability to achieve cost-effectiveness in
the presence of the design trade-off. Second, expanding demand has an additional
benefit now because every new product can be sold at a higher price to reflect the
buyback value of the product at end-of-life, but part of this benefit is “free” to the
producer since a portion of the buyback payments to consumers are made by third
parties. Consequently, the producer redirects more investment from durability to
recyclability.
In sum, the analysis in this section suggests that the direct impact of very strin-
gent collection targets may be a combination of design for recycling and product
obsolescence (i.e., reduced durability), and more so if the inherent recycling value in
the product of interest is already high.
2.5.3 Welfare and Environmental Implications
The analysis above suggests that due to the inherent trade-off between product dura-
bility and recyclability, the design implications of EPR for durable products may not
be straightforward. In particular, our results show that stringent recycling targets
may drive the producer to design more durable yet less recyclable products, and that
stringent collection targets may drive the producer to design for recyclability at the
expense of reduced durability.
In turn, these contrasting effects of recycling and collection targets on the two de-
sign for environment options suggest that EPR may not necessarily increase welfare
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in a durable goods setting. To shed light onto this issue, consider an additive wel-
fare measure that consists of three traditional economic measures: producer profits,
consumer surplus and environmental externalities (see Atasu et al. 2009, Jacobs and
Subramanian 2011, Atasu and Souza 2012, Krass et al. 2013, for similar approaches).
In our context, it is straightforward to show that both producer profits and consumer
surplus measures decrease in the stringency of the recycling and collection targets.
Hence, imposing stricter R and λ will only improve welfare if the environmental ex-
ternalities are reduced by such increases. In the existing literature (e.g., Atasu et al.
2009), which often overlooks product durability, this is often the case. When product
durability is considered, on the other hand, a reduction in environmental externalities
through increased targets is not guaranteed. For instance, Propositions 2.7 and 2.9
suggest that even though the fraction of products that end up in landfills may go
down with higher R and λ, more hazardous substances may find their ways to landfill
streams due to reduced product recyclability. Similarly, Propositions 2.6, 2.8 and
2.10 show that an emphasis on design for obsolescence may imply increased produc-
tion and higher landfilling. To shed further light onto this observation, consider the
following result:
Proposition 2.11 ∃ αR, mR and mR such that q(p∗(ρ∗, δ∗), δ∗) is increasing in R if
αR < α and mR < m < mR, and decreasing otherwise. In addition, ∃ αλ, mλ, mλ,
such that q(p∗(ρ∗, δ∗), δ∗) is increasing in λ if αλ < α and mλ < m < mλ.
Proposition 2.11 states that increasing collection or recycling targets can increase
the overall production and the associated waste generation. In particular, products
that have moderate production costs can face this dilemma. For such products, if
the inherent recycling value is high, increased recycling or collection targets can lead
to increased production because of an emphasis on increasing recyclability at the
expense of durability. Figure 3 shows such an example with respect to R. In sum, the
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Figure 3: The rebound effect of legislation on the new production volume.
α = 0.45, β = 1.15, τ = 1, b = 1, d = 0.8, m = 0.76
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take-away from this figure is that the environmental impact and welfare implications
of EPR are not clear cut in the durable goods context.
In closing this section, we also note that our discussion so far has focused on
instances of legislation where a producer would directly reap the benefits of what it has
sown with respect to recyclability improvements in its products. However, it is also
important to note that there are other forms of EPR implementations under which
a producer’s capability of fully realizing its return on recyclability can be limited. In
particular, collective EPR implementations that use weight- or volume- based cost
allocations that do not take into account product recyclability, or advance recycling or
disposal fees based EPR implementations (see Atasu and Van Wassenhove 2011 and
Plambeck and Wang 2009 for examples) can significantly hinder a producer’s ability
to capture its recyclability investments. The implications of our analysis for such
circumstances are as follows: A limitation in the return on recyclability investments
can be modeled as a lower return on investments in recyclability in the form of a
multiplier χ < 1 in front of ρ in the unit recycling value function v(R, ρ). This will
imply a lower ρ∗ in equilibrium, and that an increase in the stringency of collection and
recycling targets will drive the producer more towards adjusting product durability.
2.6 The Case of Photovoltaic Panels under the WEEE Di-
rective
Our work provides a framework for analyzing the producer response to EPR legislation
under the economics of a particular industry and product. To illustrate the insights
that can be generated by such an analysis, we choose the PVP industry. PVPs
are particularly relevant for our framework for four main reasons: First, PVPs are
the most recently added product category under the WEEE Directive Recast that
imposes ambitious collection and recycling targets: PVP producers have to meet a
65% collection target by 2019, and an 80% recycling target by 2018. Second, there
are two dominant technologies, c-Si and thin-film, which differ in their recyclability
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and durability. In particular, the c-Si technology produces more durable and less
recyclable PVPs than the thin-film technology (see details below). Third, PVPs
already have active secondary markets; hundreds of used PVP transactions (with
thousands of panels sold) can be found in online consumer-to-consumer trade channels
on a daily basis (Ebay 2015) and there already exist third parties selling used PVPs
(SecondSol 2015). Finally, PVP producers face tight profit margins, well below 10%
before interest and taxes (BNEF 2013, Ng 2014). As such, the product end-of-life
obligation imposed by EPR will significantly affect PVP producers’ profit margins. In
turn, although there may be many factors influencing a PVP producer’s technology
choice, the implications of EPR cannot be ignored. In particular, PVP producers will
need to carefully weigh future recycling cost liabilities associated with potentially
higher end-of-life volumes (through less durable but more recyclable panels produced
under the thin-film technology) and potentially higher unit recycling costs (through
less recyclable but more durable panels produced under the c-Si technology) in making
this choice.
To shed some light on this trade-off, we conduct a calibrated numerical study
using data from industry reports and practitioner interviews (Coker 2015, Haroon
2015). We set the current status where legislation is absent as the baseline case, and
compare it to the scenarios where legisla- tion with binding collection and recycling
targets is enforced. As discussed earlier, the durability- recyclability trade-off exists in
multiple design dimensions for PVPs. An important one is to choose the technology
for the PV cells. Currently, the major commercialized technology categories are c-Si
and thin-film. The c-Si technology was the first in the market, and it still dominates
with more than 90% market share in 2013 (Fraunhofer 2014). On the other hand,
the thin-film technology requires less material in manufacturing and exhibits higher
flexibility in application, and hence thin-film investments are expected to grow (GBI
2011, TSS 2015). The thin-film technology con- sists of three primary technologies,
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including Copper Indium Gallium Selenide (CIGS), Cadmium Telluride (CdTe) and
Amorphous Silicon (a-Si). We focus on CIGS, as it is a leading technology in the
thin-film category in terms of both efficiency and market share. We use the subscripts
j = 1, 2 for the c-Si and CIGS technologies, respectively.
We conduct the calibration study in four steps. First, we look into the economics
of recycling. We consider an estimated current collection rate λ0 = 20% in the base-
line case (BIO 2011). Under a binding collection target, the collection rate will be λ
(> 20%) as required by legislation. Recycling will both incur processing costs (i.e.,
costs of treatment for recycling) and generate recoverable material value. The process-
ing costs, denoted as cj, can vary significantly between different recycling procedures
and facilities. These costs are also expected to change in the coming years due to the
fast evolving dynamics of the PVP recycling industry. Therefore, we use a process-
ing cost of c = $200/ton as a benchmark (Choi and Fthemakis 2014, Fthenakis and
Moskowitz 1999, BIO 2011) and then show how the result changes with different pro-
cessing cost values. We derive recoverable material values from the PVP composition
and raw material price data (see Appendix for details of the data and the calcula-
tion procedure). We convert all the unit values and costs into dollars per kilowatt
($/kW), which is the measure commonly used in the industry. Considering both the
recoverable material value and the processing costs, we calculate the recycling value
parameters αj + ρj and βj. Based on these values for each technology, in the baseline
case without legislation (where an additional subscript 0 is used), we calculate the op-
timal recycling levels r∗j0 and the unit recycling values vj0 = −12βj(r∗j0)2 + (αj + ρj)r∗j0
(see the Appendix for details). Notably, v10 = 8.3 and v20 = 10, suggesting that
PVPs with the CIGS technology have a higher unit recycling value than those with
the c-Si technology, because of their higher rare metal content that can be recovered
through recycling (e.g., indium and gallium). When a binding recycling target is in
effect, the unit recycling values become vj = −12βjR2 + (αj + ρj)R.
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Second, we estimate the durabilities of PVPs with the c-Si and the CIGS tech-
nologies. As discussed earlier, the degradation rate reflects how the efficiency of
converting sunlight into electric power – the most important functionality of PVPs to
generate consumer valuation – depreciates with time. In particular, when used panels
are traded in consumer secondary markets (e.g., on ebay or other established mar-
ketplaces online), the remaining efficiency after degradation largely determines the
resale value, which is consistent with our model. Therefore, the degradation rate is a
good proxy for product durability in this context. Studies show that the degradation
rates for c-Si and CIGS technologies are approximately 0.5%/year and 0.96%/year,
respectively (Jordan and Kurtz 2012, Coker 2015, Haroon 2015). Moreover, PVPs
commonly have an expected lifespan of 25 years, which makes a 12.5-year period con-
sistent with our model assumption of a two-period product useful life. Therefore, we
estimate the durabilities as δ1 = (1−0.5%)12.5 = 0.94 and δ2 = (1−0.96%)12.5 = 0.89;
i.e., the c-Si technology is more durable than the CIGS technology. This comparison
once again highlights the durability-recyclability trade-off in PVPs: While the CIGS
technology is more recyclable, c-Si is more durable.
Third, we study the market for PVPs. Recall that in our model, we assume
consumer types (θ that reflects the consumers’ product valuations) to be uniformly
distributed over [0, 1]. In reality, however, the distribution of consumer types can
have a more general support on [0, X] with X > 0. We infer the values of Xj
by using the current PVP market prices pj and production costs gj obtained from




(Xj(1+δj)−gj+λ0vj). This analysis allows us to calibrate our study with X1 =
1.26 × 103 and X2 = 1.43 × 103 (see Appendix for details). We extend our model to
account for general Xj values. In this case, the producer profits in equilibrium can be








when legislation with a binding recycling target R and collection target λ is enforced.
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Finally, we analyze the influence of EPR on the producers’ product technology
choices through its impact on profitability: As discussed earlier, maintaining positive
profit margins is a challenge for PVP producers, where margins are tight (BNEF 2013,
Ng 2014). As such, the influence of EPR on a PVP producer’s profit can be expected
to be substantive. To this end, we calculate the relative change in profit due to EPR
for a given product technology choice as ∆Πj =
Πj−Πj0
Πj
, where the technology j with
the larger ∆Πj is more vulnerable to legislation because the end-of-life obligation
causes a more significant erosion to its profit margin. While various factors may
influence a producer’s technology choice, ∆Πj is useful for illustrating the directional
impacts of EPR on the possible technology choice of a PVP producer. Focusing on
this measure, Figure 4 suggests that the c-Si technology (that is more durable but
less recyclable) will face a lower profit margin erosion from a high recycling target
under EPR, and the more recyclable but less durable CIGS technology’s profit margin
erosion will be lower only if the collection target imposed by EPR is very high.
The figure also suggests that the effect of EPR on these technology choices will
depend on market dynamics with respect to processing cost efficiency improvements
for recycling (represented by the shifting dashed lines in the figure): The more efficient
the PVP recycling process, the lower the EPR-driven profit margin erosion with
the CIGS technology. This is an important observation for our purposes because
only a low volume of the panels have reached end-of-life to date due to their long
lifespans, implying that the PVP recycling market is not mature enough to operate at
a sufficiently high volume that achieves economies of scale (Besiou and Wassenhove
2015). At the current processing cost of $200/ton, our results suggest that with
a recycling target above 70%, which is within the range proposed by the WEEE
Directive Recast, the profit margin erosion of the more durable c-Si technology is
lower than the CIGS technology (as shown by the solid line in the figure). As such,
the proposed recycling targets encourage producers to choose a technology with higher
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Figure 4: Predicted PVP technology choice under different collection and recycling
targets and processing cost efficiency levels
durability and lower recyclability. As volumes increase and the processing cost goes
down (e.g., below $190/ton), however, the region within which the profit margin
erosion of the CIGS technology is lower expands (as shown by the dashed lines). In
other words, provided that a certain processing cost efficiency is achieved through
scale economies over time, the CIGS technology can be preferred for a wider range of
legislative targets. Only then will EPR have achieved its objective of making PVPs
more recyclable, especially if supported by high collection targets.
2.7 Conclusions
In this paper, we analyze a durable good producer’s design choices regarding product
durability and recyclability under EPR. In particular, we posit that design incentives
induced by EPR are not restricted to design for recyclability. Rather, EPR can
also provide incentives to alter product durability. This could be a direct incentive:
Designing durable products can reduce production, and in turn the volume of products
a producer is responsible for recycling under EPR. This could also be an indirect
incentive: If the producer chooses to increase product recyclability, the design trade-
off may result in reduced durability.
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Our analysis regarding the effect of recycling targets, a key component of EPR im-
plementations such as the WEEE Directive, on producers’ EPR-driven design choices,
suggests the following: When recyclability and durability are synergistic design at-
tributes, i.e., they are reinforcing, stringent recycling targets work as intended: They
lead a producer to design easier to recycle and more durable products. Essentially,
easier to recycle product designs help increase unit recycling value at the end-of-
life, and durable product designs (directly) reduce the total volume a producer has
to recycle. In contrast, when recyclability and durability are conflicting design at-
tributes, i.e., improving either dimension makes it harder to improve the other as in
the example of PVPs, the effect of recycling targets can be ambiguous. Our analysis
regarding this design trade-off suggests that low but sufficiently stringent recycling
targets will drive product design for recyclability, yet this will be at the expense of
product durability. However, the opposite may occur under high recycling targets,
and a producer will improve durability at the expense of recyclability. This sug-
gests that contrary to intuition, recycling target stringency - a lever that appears to
deal purely with recycling processes, does not necessarily imply producer incentives
to design for recyclability. More importantly, very strict recycling targets may even
compromise recyclable product designs, and more so if the base production costs are
already low.
Another interesting finding from our analysis is that the effect of increased collec-
tion targets on EPR-driven product design choices differs substantially from that of
recycling targets. To be more specific, when a durability-recyclability trade-off exists
in product design, a low but sufficiently stringent collection target induces an increase
in durability while compromising recyclability. In contrast, a high collection target in-
duces an increase in recyclability while compromising durability. In particular, when
recycling is valuable (be it driven by commodity price dynamics for recycled materials
or the inherent product characteristics), higher collection targets always imply more
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recyclable yet less durable product designs.
From the policy maker perspective, our results suggest that the environmental
implications of EPR may be far from intuitive in the case of durable products: Al-
though recycling and collection targets appear to focus on environmental concerns
associated with the end-of-life phase of the product life-cycle, they may also influence
the production and use phases in the product life-cycle through their effect on de-
sign for durability. In view of this, we show that seemingly similar legislative targets
may work in opposing directions in driving producers’ design choices (see Plambeck
and Wang 2009 for a similar discussion in the context of new product introduction
frequency). More importantly, more stringent legislative targets do not always guar-
antee improved environmental performance (see Esenduran et al. 2015 and Krass et
al. 2013 for similar discussion). In particular, our results suggest that if the policy
maker’s objective is to induce recyclability (i.e., increase landfill diversion or achieve
higher quality of recycling), a low recycling target accompanied with a high collection
target may be ideal. Likewise, if the policy maker’s objective is to reduce consumption
through durability via EPR, a high recycling target accompanied by a low collection
target may be ideal.
We conclude that the economic and environmental impact of increasing legislative
stringency is more subtle than appears at first glance. As illustrated by our calibrated
data analysis for PVPs, our model provides a framework for analyzing the producer
response to different legislative targets under the economics of the particular industry
and product. Such an analysis can support the setting of legislative targets that are
adapted to different product categories.
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CHAPTER III
LEMONS, TRADE-INS, AND REMANUFACTURING
3.1 Introduction
A crucial premise for any trade to take place in the market is for the trading price
to match the quality of the product. When product quality information cannot be
credibly communicated, it threatens the well-functioning of the market. Secondary
market of durable products is particularly vulnerable to such risks, which is referred
to as the lemons problem as studied by Akerlof in his seminal paper (Akerlof, 1970).
To be more specific, used durable products for sale in the secondary market may
be of diverse qualities, due to the embedded production variations that only show
up through use (e.g., semi-conductors) or the different patterns of previous usage
(e.g., on-time maintenance vs. abuse). However, while information on the quality
of any particular used item is known to the seller as being the original owner, it
may not be observable to the buyers prior to purchase. Under such asymmetric
information, the buyers can only estimate the average quality in the market, based
on which they offer the buying price. This price will then be lower then the fair price
of the high-quality items (hereafter referred to as peaches) and higher than that of
the low-quality ones (the lemons). Therefore, it incentivies the sellers to hold on to
the (under-priced) peaches but sell the (over-priced) lemons into the market. Such
behavior of strategically holding only the peaches pushes down the average market
quality. As a result, the lemons problem arises and trade activities in the secondary
market are suppressed.
When the lemons problem strikes, it hurts the resale value of the products to be
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realized in the secondary market. The markets of used automobiles typically suf-
fer from the lemons problem because the quality difference can be quite significant
but not easily observable. As a result, even cars in good-condition are commonly
traded at low prices. Another demonstrating example is the Microsoft’s Xbox 360:
When some of the devices were hacked into from the online gaming network and later
banned by the company, the market prices of used Xboxes plummeted almost imme-
diately. That is because now the actual qualities (whether they are still supported by
Microsoft in this case) can vary across used items but are only known to the sellers.
To avoid this negative impact, academic efforts have been made to explore different
ways to attack the lemons problem. One of the proposed solutions is to lease new
products rather than selling them (Hendel and Lizzeri, 2002, Johnson and Waldman,
2003). The rationale behind leasing is that, unlike selling, the manufacturer main-
tains ownership of the products, and therefore has the additional control over the
option price at which the lessees can buyout the used products at the end of the
leasing term. By properly setting this price, the manufacturer exerts influence on the
quality threshold, below which the lessees release the cars to the secondary market,
consequently changing the average market quality. Despite this potential of leasing
in providing certain alleviation, studies also suggest that leasing can only entirely
resolve the lemons problem under a very limited condition, where each consumer’s
valuation of the product strictly falls into one of the two types (Hendel and Lizzeri,
2002).
A different approach to deal with the lemons problem is to offer trade-in programs,
as discussed in Rao et al. 2009. When a consumer trades in the used product upon
the purchase of a new one, the manufacturer typically offers a discount on the new
purchase (i.e., the trade-in discount) in addition to making the buyback payment
for the used unit; and the manufacturer later resells the trade-in used items as-is
in the secondary market. In essence, the trade-in programs take effect in attacking
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the lemons problem because the trade-in discount increases the effective payment
and hence encourages more peach owners to also sell the peaches into the secondary
market, which brings up the average quality. Nevertheless, the trade-in program is
neither a perfect solution, because it can be shown that the strategic peach-holding
behavior is not entirely eliminated. That means there are still more lemons than
peaches in the secondary market, and the lemons problem persists. This motivates
us to search for a better solution.
To identify a viable direction for our search, we delve into the root of the lemons
problem. The information asymmetry in fact creates two types of mismatches that, in
combination, eventually cause the lemons problem. On the one hand, as mentioned
above, the offering price by the buyers mismatches (falls below) the fair price of
the peaches and (goes above) that of the lemons. Meanwhile, on the other hand,
the product quality perceived by the buyers (i.e., the average market quality) also
mismatches the actual peach- and lemon-qualities. This understanding is revealing in
explaining the reason why the manufacturer can alleviate the lemons problem both
by leasing (with the option price) and trade-in (with the trade-in discount): They
address the price aspect of the problem and narrow the price gap between the one
offered by the buyers and the one demanded by the sellers. More importantly, the
argument also tells why these two solutions are not strong enough: Neither of them
actively address the quality aspect of the problem. Distilling from this discussion is
the valuable insight that the key to resolve the lemons problem lies in constructing a
mechanism that can also address the quality aspect of the problem.
To execute this idea, note that with the trade-in programs, the manufacturer
accepts the trade-in products before reselling them as-is. The possession in this
process provides the manufacturer with an opportunity to actively interfere with
the quality of the used products. In particular, we study two strategies to achieve
that. One is Testing, with which the manufacturer first identifies the quality of each
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trade-in product through testing, and then sells the lemons and peaches separately
in the secondary market. The another strategy is Remanufacturing, with which the
manufacturer first tests the trade-in items, and then remanufactures them such that
it ensures all the products for resale will be of the same quality. Notably, although
both strategies reveal the quality information in the resale secondary market, it is
not trivial that they necessarily resolve the lemons problem. That is because when
the used products are first released into the market (to the manufacturer through
trade-ins, to be specific), information asymmetry still exists; i.e., sellers can still
take advantage of their superior quality information and stick with the strategic
peach-holding behavior to sell more lemons than peaches, giving rise to the lemons
problem. In this paper, we study the effectiveness of Testing and Remanufacturing
in the lemons context, which has never been explored in the literature. Furthermore,
we also investigate how these strategies influence the market on both the consumers’
purchasing and trade-in patterns and the manufacturer’s pricing decisions.
This study contributes to the literature as we innovatively propose and analyt-
ically confirm the strategies of Testing and Remanufacturing as effective solutions
that are able to entirely eliminate the lemons problem, and we further reveal their
impacts on the market. Another contribution of the paper is that we take the re-
sults forward to also derive a useful and comprehensive guidance for manufacturers
on whether to use Testing or Remanufacturing when faced with the lemons problem,
and how to properly account for the product characteristics in this decision-making
process. We conclude that for products that are more durable or more costly to pro-
duce, Remanufacturing will be a better option that yields higher manufacturer profit.
Remanufacturing is also preferred when the relative quality difference between lemons
and peaches is small for more durable products, or when the relative quality difference
is large for less durable products.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. We first review related research
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to position our paper in the existing literature in Section 3.2. We describe the prob-
lem and construct the model in Section 3.3. We set the case where the manufacturer
only offers trade-ins (studied in Rao et al. 2009) as the benchmark case; and then
summarize the analytical results of this case, some of which as derived in Rao et al.
(2009), in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 and 3.6 investigate the Testing and Remanufac-
turing strategies, respectively. We characterize the manufacturer’s optimal decisions
and the resulting market outcome in each case, and then contrast the results to the
benchmark case with only the trade-in programs to highlight the effects of the testing
and remanufacturing processes in resolving the lemons problem. Section 3.7 compares
Testing and Remanufacturing, and derives a comprehensive guidance for manufactur-
ers on how to make the optimal choice from the two strategies, and how to account for
the product characteristics. Finally, we present the insights and concluding remarks
in Section 3.8 that also discusses future research issues.
3.2 Literature review
Our paper draws on and contributes to several streams of research including durable
goods with a special focus on secondary markets, trade-ins and remanufacturing. We
review related papers in each stream and position our research at the point of their
intersection.
The secondary markets play a significant role for durable goods, especially with
their rapidly growing sizes. For example, in the U.S., the volume of used car transac-
tions is approximately three times as large as that of new cars. Their importance is
also reflected by the keen interest it receives in the durable goods literature. Existing
research has explored different effects of secondary markets such as the possible can-
nibalization that influences the demand and price of the new product sales (Valerie
2008, Volker and Martin 2003), and the allocative and market segmentation effects
(Anderson and Ginsburgh 1994, Porter and Sattler 1999) etc. Our research focuses
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on developing strategies to actively interfere with the secondary market. Examples
of secondary market inference for different purposes include the follows: Hendel and
Lizzeri (1999b) discuss the use of leasing instead of selling to gain more market power
in the secondary market, because leasing allows the manufacturer to maintain product
ownership even after the expiration of the leasing contract. For example, the man-
ufacturer can limit the volume of used products by scrapping some of the off-lease
items. The paper shows that leasing has a positive impact on profitability because
it enables active control over price of the used goods so that the manufacturer can
better exploit the market segmentation effect of the secondary market to extract more
consumer surplus. Bulow (1982) also shows that gaining stronger control by leasing
helps alleviate the time inconsistency problem. Charging a relicensing fee to buyers of
refurbished items, discussed in Oraiopoulos et al. (2002), is another way to influence
the secondary market. The underlying mechanism is to adjust the actual resale value
by this fee, so as to increase profit by obtaining an optimal balance between the posi-
tive (resale value) and the negative (cannibalization) effects exerted by the secondary
market. In this paper, secondary market interference is motivated by the attempt to
resolve the lemons problem, and the strategies we consider include offering trade-in
programs, conducting testing or remanufacturing.
Trade-in programs are widely used as a marketing strategy. For example, they
can be utilized to practice price discrimination for inducing higher sales or extracting
more consumer surplus (van Ackere and Reyniers 1993, 1995, Agrawal et al. 2008);
they also help attract the return of cores for profitable remanufacturing (Ferrer and
Whybark 2001, Heese et al. 2005), and Ray et al. (2005) study the optimal design of
the trade-in programs for the remanufacturable used products; moreover, Levinthal
and Purohit (1989) show that trade-ins can accelerate the diffusion process for new
product generations by inducing earlier retirements of the old versions. The focus
of trade-ins in our paper is their effect on interfering with the secondary market, in
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particular, on tackling the lemons problem. In this regard, our research is closely
related to Rao et al. (2009). The paper illustrates that the lemons problem can be
alleviated by offering trade-ins that essentially increase the effective payment made
to the sellers through the trade-in discount. This encourages more peaches to also
be released into the secondary market, and therefore increases the average quality
and remedies the problem. Our paper adds significant enrichment to this stream of
research by first delving into the root of the lemons problem and deriving an revealing
explanation of the strength and weakness of the trade-in programs. Building on that
understanding, we are also able to propose better solutions including conducting
testing and remanufacturing.
Remanufacturing has been extensively studied in the sustainable operations liter-
ature, mainly with a focus on the value recovery aspect, as remanufacturing performs
necessary value-added repair or reprocessing to enhance the quality of used products
and render them sellable again, typically at a cost that is lower than the new pro-
duction. Remanufacturing can also be used to interfere with the secondary market:
Ferguson and Toktay, 2006 shows that remanufacturing benefits the manufacturer by
deterring third-party entrance and competition in the secondary market. To our best
knowledge, this paper is the first to propose and explore conducting remanufacturing
to deal with the lemons problem. We show that it is indeed an effective lever and
we further delineate its underlying mechanism and impacts on the market in this
context. In addition to this contribution to the literature, we also provide useful and
valuable insights that readily speak to manufacturers of different products by deriving
a comprehensive guidance on how to choose the optimal secondary market strategies




We construct a discrete-time, infinite-horizon model to study a manufacturer selling
durable products to consumers. Periods are indexed by t ≥ 0.
3.3.1 The Market
We assume that each product has a two-period useful life to capture the product
durable nature (Desai and Purohit 1998, Huang et al. 2001). A product is called new
and used, respectively, in the first and second period of its lifespan; then it becomes
valueless at the end of the second period. All new products are of identical quality.
After one period of use, however, a new product can deteriorate into a peach with
probability α (0 ≤ α ≤ 1), or a lemon with probability 1 − α. To keep the analysis
concise, we do not consider skewness in product quality and assume α = 1
2
. The
information on the quality realization is asymmetric for any particular used product:
It is only known to the first-period owner of the product, but not observable to the
buyers before purchase.
3.3.2 The Manufacturer
At t = 0, the manufacturer chooses the secondary market strategy. We compare three
options in this paper, namely, Trade-in, Testing, and Remanufacturing. In every
sequential period t > 0, the manufacturer produces new products at the unit cost
c, and then sells them at the price pt. Moreover, (i) with the Trade-in strategy, the
manufacturer accepts trade-ins of used products from consumers upon their purchase
of new ones. In a trade-in, the manufacturer offers a discounted price ptT for the new
product, in addition to paying the price ptu for the used unit. p
t − ptT is the trade-
in discount. End-of-life products are excluded from the trade-in program, as it is a
common practice that firms explicitly require the products to be in working condition
to qualify for any trade-in discounts (Apple 2013b). After receiving the trade-in used
products, the manufacturer then sells all of them as-is to the secondary market at the
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used product price ptu, where p
t
u is endogenously determined by the secondary market
through market clearing.1 (ii) With the Testing strategy, the manufacturer still offers
the trade-in program to acquire used products in the same way as described above.
The difference is that, instead of selling as-is, now the manufacturer first conducts
testing to identify the qualities of the used products. The manufacturer then reveals
this quality information by selling the lemons and peaches separately in the secondary
market. (iii) With the Remanufacturing strategy, the manufacturer takes one step
further than the Testing strategy: After accepting the used items through trade-ins
and testing for their qualities, the manufacturer remanufactures to ensure that every
unit is now of the peach-quality. Then the manufacturer sells the remanufactured
products in the secondary market.
3.3.3 The Consumers
There exists a unit mass of consumers with different product valuations denoted by
θ. We capture the consumer heterogeneity by assuming θ to be uniformly distributed
over [0, 1]. A consumer of type θ obtains a per-period utility of θ, δθ, and δ(1 − s)θ,
respectively from a new product, a peach, and a lemon, with 0 < δ < 1 and 0 < s < 1.
δ reflects the value depreciation over time through use, and is therefore referred to as
the product durability: A product with a higher δ is more durable as it maintains its
value better even in the later stage of its useful life. s captures the relative quality
inferiority of a lemon compared to a peach, and hence also indicates the extent of the
quality uncertainty.
In every period t > 0, the manufacturer determines the prices corresponding to its
secondary market strategy choice, followed by the consumers making their purchasing
and trade-in decisions. We focus on the stationary equilibria, where all the prices
1When the trade-in program is available, all consumers who replace their used product with a
new one will sell the used item to the manufacturer through trade-ins rather than selling to the
consumer secondary market, because the former also offers the trade-in discount in addition to the
buyback payment ptu.
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and the aggregate consumer behavior remain constant over time and all explicit time
dependence t can be dropped from the notations (Hendel and Lizzeri 1999, Huang et
al. 2001, Plambeck and Wang 2009, Agrawal et al. 2015). This helps rule out the
transient effects due to only new products being sold in the first period.
3.4 Benchmark: The strategy with Trade-in
To highlight the effects of quality intervention by the Testing and Remanufacturing
strategies, we first study the benchmark case where the manufacuturer adopts the
Trade-in strategy as studied in Rao et al. (2009). We present the main results de-
rived by following similar solution procedures in Rao et al. (2009) but with different
parameterization that is consistent with our model setup to facilitate later discussion
and comparison. We also incorporate constraints that ensure non-negative sales vol-
umes and allow a positive unit production cost to add rigor and depth in the analysis.
The details of this case and the main conclusions are summarized below.
In every period, depending on the new product prices with and without trade-ins
(i.e., p and pt) set by the manufacturer, the consumers can choose their single-period
actions from the followings: to buy a new product, to buy a used one from the
secondary market, to keep the used product for the second period if a new one was
bought in the last period, or to remain inactive. To fully characterize the consumer
behavior given that the durable products last for two periods, Result 3.1 identifies the
consumer strategies that describe the consumer actions at two consecutive periods.
Result 3.1 When the manufacturer adopts the Trade-in strategy, there are four non-
dominated consumer strategies: (I) Always buy a new product in every period (NN);
(II) Buy a new product; in the next period, keeps the product if it deteriorates into a
peach but sells it if it deteriorates into a lemon (NP); (III) Always buy a used product
in every period (UU); (IV) Always remain inactive in every period (II).
Each consumer, depending on his own type θ, will self-select into following one of
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the four strategies that yields the highest utility. As a result, the market is divided
into four segments.
Result 3.2 In equilibrium, the market segmentation outcome is as follows:2
Case(I) When 0 < δ ≤ 4
4+s
.
∃θTI11 , θTI12 , θTI13 with 0 < θTI13 ≤ θTI12 ≤ θTI11 < 1, such that the optimal strategy
for a consumer of type θ will be: (I) NN, when θ ∈ (θTI11 , 1); or (II) NP, when
θ ∈ (θTI12 , θTI11 ]; (III) UU, when θ ∈ (θTI13 , θTI12 ]; and (IV) II, when θ ∈ (0, θTI13 ].
Case(II) When 4
4+s
≤ δ < 1.
∃θTI21 , θTI22 with 0 < θTI22 ≤ θTI21 < 1, such that the optimal strategy for a
consumer of type θ will be: (I) NP, when θ ∈ (θTI21 , 1); (II) UU, when θ ∈
(θTI22 , θ
TI2
1 ]; and (III) II, when θ ∈ (0, θTI22 ].
Result 3.3 The optimal prices and the resulting profit for the manufacturer are sum-
marized as follows, the superscript TI indicates that the Trade-in strategy is adopted.




≤ δ < 1
pTI 1 + δ − 2(−1+δ)(−4+3(−4+s)δ)(−2+2c+(−2+s)δ)
−32+δ(−64+96δ+s(48+(−48+s)δ))












Based on the market characterization, Rao et al. (2009) points out that the
size of the NP segment shrinks under Trade-in, so this strategy alleviates the lemons
problem. To see the reason, note that in the secondary market, the root of the lemons
problem is that the qualities of products are uncertain, and whether a particular used
product is a lemon or a peach is solely known to the seller but not to the buyers.
2Note that Case(II) in Result 3.2 is not included in Rao et al. (2009), it emerges from the
boundary condition where the size of the NN segment reduces to zero.
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Under this asymmetric information, buyers can only estimate the average quality in
the market, based on which they offer the buying price. Notably, this price will be
lower than the fair price of peaches as long as there are some lemons. This creates the
adverse incentive for used product owners to hold on to the peaches but sell off the
lemons. As a result of having these strategic peach-holders (i.e., the NP segment),
the secondary market is filled with more lemons than peaches and hence has lower
average quality, suppressing trade activities. The Trade-in strategy offers trade-in
discount in addition to the buyback payment for the used item, essentially increasing
the total payment made to consumers for trading in. The additional financial reward
then translates into a correcting incentive that encourages more used product owners
to deviate from the strategic peach-holding behavior and release also the peaches they
have into the secondary market. As the NP segment diminishes, Trade-in alleviates
the lemons problem that leads to low average quality in the secondary market.
However, in spite of this favorable effect of the Trade-in strategy, the strategic
peach-holding behavior still exists, evident by the persistence of the NP segment. In
other words, Trade-in is not capable of resolving the lemons problem entirely. We seek
explanation for this weakness of Trade-in by delving into the bottom of the lemons
problem: It essentially involves two types of mismatches. On the one hand, the
offering price by the buyers mismatches with the fair price demanded by the peach-
owners. Meanwhile, on the other hand, there is also a mismatch between the peach-
quality and the quality perceived by the buyers, i.e., the average market quality. Since
Trade-in, while utilizing the price lever by offering the trade-in discount, is only able
to address the price mismatch, it cannot fully resolve the problem although providing
partial alleviation. This understanding of the nature of the problem is revealing:
It suggests a direction for constructing a stronger solution, which is to add back
the missing piece, i.e., to also incorporate the quality lever. This rationale motives
us to study two strategies in the next sections. One is the Testing strategy, which
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allows the manufacturer to obtain the quality information and then communicate it
with the secondary market. The other one is the Remanufacturing strategy, where
the manufacturer takes one more step to directly intervene with the used product
quality.
Rao et al. (2009) also shows that an increase in the relative quality inferiority
of lemons (s) or in the product durability (δ) both reduces the volume of trade
in the secondary market and requires the manufacturer to offer a higher trade-in
discount. The reason is that as the lemon-quality is lower than the peach-quality by
δs, a rise in δ or s means that the lemons become worse lemons, and it exacerbates
the extent of the quality uncertainty and hence the lemons problem in the secondary
market. Consequently, trade activities are dampened, and a bigger financial incentive
by the trade-in discount is needed to alleviate the lemons problem. While these
results demonstrate the market impacts of the lemons problem, they may not be
comprehensive enough to capture all the secondary market dynamics, because Rao
et al. (2009) has normalized the unit production cost c to be zero.
In this paper, we relax this assumption and allow 0 ≤ c ≤ 1. To see the significance
of accounting for the costly production, we augment the analysis on the volume of
trade in the secondary market with c and present the result in Part (I) of Corollary
3.4. Depending on the production cost, the conclusion can vary considerably. In
particular, the volume of trade is influenced by both (i) the lemons problem, and (ii)
the interactions between the primary market (for new products) and the secondary
market. When δ increases, the former factor has a negative impact and pushes down
the volume of trade as discussed, but the latter factor has a positive impact especially
when c is high. Under a high value of c, new products are scarce in the primary market,
which limits the cannibalization of the secondary market on the primary sales even
when products are more durable. Meanwhile, increase in durability helps the products
better serve the market because the used items become closer alternatives to the new
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ones and hence supplement the (low-volume) new products to satisfy the market
demand. Therefore, higher δ drives up both the new and the used product volumes
due to the primary-secondary market interaction. When this effect dominates the
effect of the lemons problem, the volume of trade in the secondary market may in
fact increase in δ as shown in the corollary. As pointed out by Hendel and Lizzari
(1999), the primary-secondary market interaction is an important factor in thoroughly
understanding the impacts of the lemons problem; for example, the interaction is the
exact reason why the secondary market does not shut down completely, which is in
sharp contrast to the prediction in Akerlof (1970). We capture the unit production
cost and demonstrate that it may have other significant implications later.
Corollary 3.4 (I) The volume of trade in the secondary market is increasing in
δ when the unit production cost is small enough, but is (concavely) increasing
then decreasing in δ when c is large enough.
(II) The volume of new product sales is decreasing in δ when c is small enough, but
increasing in δ when c is large enough.
3.5 The Strategy of Testing
As discussed above, strategic peach-holders that cause the lemons problem, persist
even with the Trade-in strategy, because the strategy only addresses the price aspect
of the problem by the trade-in discount. Therefore, we expect that we can construct
more effective solution by also utilizing a quality lever. Motivated by this, we study
the Testing strategy that allows the manufacturer to practice quality intervention in
the secondary market.
In this case, the new production, the primary market sales and the trade-in process
remain the same. However, after acquiring the used products through trade-ins, the
manufacturer first tests all of them to identify their qualities, assuming at a zero
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unit testing cost.3 Then the manufacturer communicates the quality information to
the market by setting different prices pl and pp to sell the lemons and the peaches
separately. Although it may seem straightforward that the lemons problem goes away
when the manufacturer reveals the quality information in the resale. Nevertheless,
the lemons problem in fact still threatens the market, but now the manufacturer,
instead of the buyers in the secondary market, is directly bearing the associated cost.
This is because when used products are traded in to the manufacturer, the product
qualities are still only known to the original owners, and the manufacturer pays the
uniform unit price determined by the overall market quality without knowing whether
a particular product is a lemon or a peach. In this case, the used product owners
can still strategically hold on to the peaches and sell the lemons; consequently, more
lemons are released, and the manufacturer can only resell them at a lower price.
We first characterize the consumer behavior. Denote the consumer purchasing
actions in the current and the last periods as a and a′, respectively. We derive the
payoffs of a type θ consumer in the current period from different action choices, as
summarized in Table 1 below. Note that the payoffs depend on both a and a′ (for
example, a consumer can trade in a used unit if a new one was bought in the last
period). Moreover, a consumer can only keep a peach/lemon when a new one was
bought in the last period, and infeasible cases are represented by a dash. Based on
the payoffs, we study the consumer strategies.
Lemma 3.5 In the stationary equilibrium when the manufacturer adopts the Testing
strategy, there are six non-dominated consumer strategies: (I) Always buy a new
product in every period (NN); (II) Buy a new product; in the next period, keep the
3For a wide category of products, network devices for example, although testing incurs a signifi-
cant upfront fixed cost such as purchasing the testing equipment, the variable testing cost for each
additional unit is low, which justifies the assumption of zero unit testing cost.
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Table 1: Consumer payoff table under the Testing strategy.










Buy a new θ − pt + pu θ − p+ pu θ − p+ pu θ − p+ pu θ − p+ pu θ − p+ pu
Keep a peach δθ − pu − − − − −
Keep a lemon δθ(1−s)−pu − − − − −
Buy a peach δθ − pp δθ − pp δθ − pp δθ − pp δθ − pp δθ − pp
Buy a lemon δθ(1− s)−pl δθ(1−s)−pl δθ(1−s)−pl δθ(1−s)−pl δθ(1−s)−pl δθ(1−s)−pl
Buy a reman δθ − pr δθ − pr δθ − pr δθ − pr δθ − pr δθ − pr
Inactive 0 0 0 0 0 0
product if it deteriorates into a peach but sells it if it deteriorates into a lemon (NP);
(III) Buy a new product; in the next period, keep the product regardless of the quality
realization (NH); (IV) Always buy a peach in every period (PP); (V) Always buy a
lemon in every period (LL); (VI) Always remain inactive and buy nothing (II).
The expected per-period utility for a type θ consumer from the different strategies









; (IV) PP: VPP [θ] = δθ− pp; (V) LL: VLL = δ(1− s)θ− pl
(VI) II: VII [θ] = 0.
Given the sequential nature of the game, we solve the problem backwards, starting
from the optimal consumer strategies and the resulting market segmentation outcome,
and then characterize the manufacturer’s optimal pricing decisions. We present the
results in Proposition 3.6 (All proofs are relegated to the Appendix).
Proposition 3.6 When the manufacturer adopts the Testing strategy, it maximizes


















Given the prices, ∃θTest1 , θTest2 , θTest3 with 0 < θTest3 ≤ θTest2 ≤ θTest1 < 1, such
that a consumer of type θ optimally chooses the strategy (I) NN, when θ ∈ (θTest1 , 1),
(II) PP, when θ in(θTest2 , θ
Test
1 ], (III) LL, when θ ∈ (θTest3 , θTest2 ], and (IV) II, when
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θ ∈ (0, θTest3 ].
This is a result of notable significance as it shows that the manufacturer can elimi-
nate the lemons problem by the Testing strategy. It is confirmed by the disappearance
of the NP segment, which means that when a consumer sells a used item, he does
so regardless whether he has a lemon or a peach. In other words, now the market
no longer suffers from having more lemons than peaches caused by the asymmetric
quality information emerges when the used products are released into the market (to
the manufacturer in this case) by their first-period owners.
As discussed earlier, the quality information asymmetry of the used items causes
the mismatch in price (between the fair price of peaches and the buying price offered
by the buyers), and the mismatch in quality (between the peach-quality and the buy-
ers’ perceived quality, i.e., the average market quality). The Trade-in strategy, with
its trade-in discount that increases the effective payment to the peach-holders, works
solely on the price aspect and hence only alleviates the problem but fails to eliminate
it entirely. The Testing strategy, on the other hand, makes up the deficiency of Trade-
in by also utilizing the quality lever. Compared to reselling the trade-ins as-is as with
the Trade-in strategy, the additional testing process that identifies the used product
qualities critically allows the manufacturer to actively practice quality intervention
in the secondary market. Specifically, the manufacturer executes the intervention by
revealing the qualities and selling the lemons and peaches separately. In this process,
while removing the quality mismatch in the secondary market, the manufacturer also
gains the pricing control over the used products (as it can now set the prices of the
lemons and peaches). This additional control, along with the pricing power over the
new products, is then strategically exploited by the manufacturer in combination,
which eventually prices out the NP segment and eliminates the lemons problem. We
further point out that pricing out the NP segment is realized by redirecting the NP
consumers to either the NN or the PP segment: Under the optimal pricing by the
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manufacturer, the effective cost of replacing a used product (which is pt−pu) is lower
under the Testing strategy compared to the Trade-in case, making NN a captivator
for consumers. On the other hand, pp is determined so as to render buying peaches
with their uniform quality a better option to attract consumers away from the NP
segment, especially for the lower type consumers.
Another interesting observation from this result is that while a unique trade-in
discounted new product price pt and used product price pu exist at optimality with
Trade-in, pt and pu are always coupled with Testing. With Testing, pu only acts as
the acquisition price of the used units, so pu is coupled with pt because the acquisition
concurs with the offering of the discounted new product price pt in trade-ins. As such,
for consumers, pt − pu is the effective price of replacing a used item with a new one
through trade-in; and for the manufacturer, the trade-in process can be equivalently
regarded as paying p − pt + pu for the used item and charging the regular price p
for the replacing new purchase. In contrast, with Trade-in where used items are sold
as-is, the manufacturer has no direct pricing control over used products and pu is also
the price for the resale. As a result, pu is decoupled from pt and individual optimal
values exist to maximize the manufacturer profit.
In the emergence of the lemons problem, only the strategic peach-holders reap
benefit from taking advantage of the superior quality information they have, at the
expense of the market (e.g., average secondary market quality is dragged down and
buyers of used items could be paying a high-than-fair price to only receive lemons).
To see it another way, for the manufacturer in particular, the profit margin from the
NP segment is always dominated: A close scrutiny of the NP segment tells that a
portion of these consumers buy a new product and then hold on to it for two periods
because the product deteriorates into a peach. Their purchasing pattern follows that
of the NH consumers and they generate the same profit margin. The rest of the NP
consumers buy a new product and then replace it in the next period as it turns into
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a lemon. While this resembles the behavior of the NN consumers, the NP consumers
sell only lemons to the manufacturer, which are of lower resale value. Therefore, the
profit margin from the NP segment is always lower than either the NN or the NH
segment. The implication of this discussion is that the manufacturer should be better
off when it is able to eliminate the lemons problem, and this is confirmed by the profit
comparison that shows ΠTI < ΠTest.
3.6 The Strategy of Remanufacturing
In addition to Testing, the manufacturer can also adopt Remanufacturering for uti-
lizing the quality lever to tackle the lemons problem. Specifically, with this strategy,
the manufacturer takes in the trade-in products and tests them as in the Testing case,
but now it also remanufactures the lemons into the peach-quality, incurring a unit
cost of us. The unit cost accounts for the higher expense to remanufacture a worse
lemon (with larger quality inferiority s); and u is the remanufacturing cost coefficient,
0 < us < c so that remanufacturing comes with cost saving compared to new produc-
tion as is typically in practice. Next, the manufacturer sets the price pr to resell the
processed lemons along with the peaches, all of the peach-quality, in the secondary
market as remanufactured products. For consumers, the options of single-period pur-
chasing action and the associated payoffs are similar to the Testing case, except that
“Buy a lemon” and “Buy a peach” are no longer available but instead, consumers
can now choose to “Buy a remanufactured product” that yields a per-period utility
of δθ − pr for a consumer of type θ.
We can show that under Remanufacturing, there are five non-dominated consumer
strategies. They are: NN, NP, NH, II and RR (referring to always buying remanu-
factured products in every period). We next characterize the manufacturer’s optimal
decisions and the resulting market segments (presented in increasing order of δ).
Proposition 3.7 When the manufacturer adopts the Remanufacturing strategy,
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∃us1, us2, ul1, ul2 ∈ (0, cs), such that at optimality in the stationary equilibrium:
Case(I) When 0 < δ ≤ 2
2+s
:
Subcase RS1 Subcase RS2
0 < u ≤ uII1 uII1 ≤ u ≤ uII2






pRSt − pRSu 18 (6 + 2c+ (−2 + s)δ)
(−4(2+2c+su)−24δ+(8(5+c)+2(1+c)s2+(−2+s)2su)δ2+2(−4+s2)δ3)
(4(−4+δ(−8+(12+s2)δ)))
Market Segments II RR NN II RR NH NN
Subcase RS3
uII2 ≤ u < cs
pRS 14
(





pRSt − pRSu 2−2(−4+δ)δ+2c(1+δ)+su(1+δ)4+12δ
Market Segments II NH
Case(II) When 2
2+s
≤ δ ≤ 1:
Subcase RL1 Subcase RL2 Subcase RL3








(2 + 2c− (−2 + s)δ) 1
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(6 + 2c+ (−2 + s)δ)
Market Segment II RR NN II NH RR NN II NH
Proposition 2.3 shows that the manufacturer can adopt Remanufacturing to elim-
inate the NP segment and therefore resolve the lemons problem. This is a nontrivial
and revealing result because, similar to the Testing strategy, although there is no
quality information asymmetry in the resale secondary market as all the remanu-
factured products are uniformly of the peach-quality, the lemons problem could still
emerge when the used products are first sold to the manufacturer through trade-ins,
while the manufacturer is bearing the associated cost.
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To also address the quality aspect of the lemons problem is the crucial underly-
ing mechanism of the Remanufacturing strategy to surpass Trade-in as a solution,
while Trade-in solely works on the price aspect. Under Remanufacturing, the qual-
ity intervention is executed by entirely removing the quality inferiority and ensuring
the uniform (peach-) quality of the remanufactured products now available in the
secondary market. Achieving this with the additional remanufacturing process has
empowered the manufacturer to price the remanufacturered products and strengthen
its control over the secondary market. In particular, the remanufactured and the new
product prices are strategically chosen together at optimality such that consumers
will be better off deviating from the strategic peach-holding behavior to other market
segments of NN, NH or RR. Further studying the specific prices reveals that pricing
out the NP segment in this case is achieved by the strategic combination of: increas-
ing the effective price of replacing a used product (pt − pu) to reduce the consumer
utility from NP related to NH, or increasing the price of buying a new product with-
out trade-in (p) to render NP less desired by consumers compared to NN, or to offer
remanufactured products at the properly-set price pr as an attractive substitute.
It is also interesting to observe that the market segmentation result heavily de-
pends on the cost of remanufacturing, captured by u. When u is very high, the high
cost of keeping the remanufacturing promise to the secondary market severely erodes
into the overall profitability. This drives the manufacturer to give up on serving the
NN segment (by setting very high new product prices) because it later comes with the
lemon trade-ins that incur the associated remanufacturing cost. As a result, only the
NH and II segments remain in existence. At another extreme, when u is very low, the
manufacturer optimally prefers to sell more remanufactured products because they
generate additional revenue, and the NN segment is kept as a source of used items
for remanufacturing. Hence, the manufacturer is incentivized to price out the NH
segment for expanding the RR and NN segments.
59
The value of u is also important in determining whether the manufacturer should
conduct remanufacturing or not. As discussed previously, it is in the manufacturer’s
interest to safeguard the secondary market from the threat of the lemons problem,
because only the first-period owners reap benefit from their information advantage
when the lemons problem arises. However, the manufacturer now also incurs cost in
remanufacturing. Therefore, Remanufacturing only yields a higher profit than Trade-
in when the cost of remanufacturing, captured by u, is below a certain threshold
(details of the threshold are included in the Appendix).
Under different secondary market strategy choices, the impacts of the product
characteristics s and δ can vary considerably, which we explore next (the superscript
“Reman” denotes the optimal values under Remanufacturing).
Corollary 3.8 The manufacturer profit under Trade-in (ΠTI) is of U-shape in s
when c is low enough and δ is high, monotonically increasing in s when c is low and δ
is also low, and monotonically decreasing in s otherwise. In contrast, the profit under
Remanufacturing (ΠReman) is always monotonically decreasing in s.
The corollary points out that under Remanufacturing, the profit of the manu-
facturer is always impaired by the quality inferiority. This is because by accepting
trade-ins and incurring the cost of remanufacturing the lemons, the manufacturer
is in fact undertaking the adverse financial consequence of the low product quality.
Consequently, the manufacturer is expected to be better motivated to improve its
product quality under Remanufacturing. In contrast, such is not true under Trade-in
when used products are only sold as-is. Since the profit function can be increasing
in s for certain ranges of δ and c, within which there will be no incentive for the
manufacturer to reduce the inferiority and make better products. This comparison
suggests that the manufacturer’s adoption of Remanufacturing rather than Trade-in
may be a favorable signal for product quality.
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Corollary 3.9 The volume of new production V olTIN is increasing in s when c is
small enough but decreasing in s when c is large enough. In contrast, V olRemanN is
always monotonically decreasing in s.
Under Remanufacturing, the manufacturer bears the risk of incurring remanu-
facturing cost for receiving lemons through trade-ins, and the cost increases in s.
Therefore, a higher s translates into the incentive for the manufacturer to sell less
new products and reduce the later cost liability. On the other hand, similar incentive
is absent under Trade-in because the financial consequence of having lemons in the
market is directly born by the buyers in the resale secondary market. Contrarily, the
manufacturer may want to increase new production as s rises, especially when pro-
duction is less expensive. That is because the more pronounced effect of a high s for
the manufacturer in this case, is that it reduces the overall attractiveness of buying
used products, limiting the cannibalization of the new product sales. As such, ex-
panding the new production, which is the only source of revenue for the manufacturer
under Trade-in, is preferred.
3.7 Testing vs. Remanufacturing, Which One Is Better?
Our analysis has confirmed that incorporating not only the price lever but also the
quality lever, by following the Testing or Remanufacturing strategy, is effective to
tackle the lemons problem: Both strategies eliminate the strategic consumer behav-
ior that takes advantage of the superior quality information and hence avoid having
disproportionally more lemons than peaches released into the secondary market to
bring down the average market quality. In comparison then, how should the man-
ufacturer choose between them and how do the product characteristics play a role?
The answer is not immediately clear because on the one hand, Testing saves the cost
of remanufacturing; but on the other hand, Remanufacturing can generate a larger
revenue stream in resale after the value-added remanufacturing process. We provide
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the answer in this section.
To compare the two strategies, we first relax an implicit assumption we have made
in the previous analysis: that the manufacturer resells all the trade-in used products
back to the secondary market after conducting testing or remanufacturing. The as-
sumption is kept from Rao et al. (2009) to maintain modeling consistency, so as to
facilitate the comparison with the Trade-in strategy studied in Rao et al. (2009),
and highlight the effectiveness of Testing and Remanufacturing that also address the
quality aspects in resolving the lemons problem. Moreover, the analysis with this as-
sumption also provides rich and valuable insights. However, this restriction may not
be necessarily imposed, as the manufacturer can decide the optimal resale quantity,
while scraping the rest, to further maximize profit. Exercising the quantity option to
interfere with the secondary market of durable products has been shown to have some
interesting implications for the environmental impacts (Agrawal et al., 2012) and the
the implementation of environmental regulation (Alev et al., 2016). Moreover, allow-
ing the quantity choice also removes the unfavorable bias towards Remanufacturing
in the comparison, which is purely caused by imposing the remanufacturing and the
associated cost to all the used products. Therefore, we are interested in studying how
it effects the market and the strategy choices for dealing with the lemons problem.
3.7.1 The Strategy of Testing with the Quantity Choice
In this case, the Testing strategy is the same as we described except that instead of
reselling all the lemons and peaches, the manufacturer has the option to choose the
quantities of lemons and peaches for the resale in the secondary market and then
discard the rest of the used items with no residual value. To highlight the impact
of the additional quantity decisions by the manufacturer, we focus on the product
volumes and the resulting market segments (presented in increasing order of the
consumer type θ) in the market at optimality.
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Proposition 3.10 When the manufacturer adopts the Testing strategy with the quan-
tity choice for the resale of lemons and peaches, let xTestQ and yTestQ represent the
quantities of peaches and lemons that are discarded by the manufacturer after being
acquired and tested, then
Subcase TQ1 Subcase TQ2 Subcase TQ3










Market Segments II PP NN II LL PP NN II LL PP NN
Every unit of peaches and lemons put back to the secondary market becomes an
additional source of revenue for the manufacturer. Meanwhile, however, the higher
volume of lemons and peaches drives down their market prices and they may then
lead to more severe cannibalization of new product sales. Discarding some used units
helps maintain the desired balance between these two opposing effects to enhance
profitability. When the unit production cost increases, the cost of scrapping also
increases as only the value of one-period of the product’s useful life is realized in the
market. This explains the decrease in the discarded volume in the production cost.
Moreover, lemons are discarded before peaches due to their lower resale value. Finally,
this result also reaffirms the significance of capturing the effect of the production cost.
3.7.2 The Strategy of Remanufacturing with the Quantity Choice
When the manufacturer has the quantity choice under the Remanufacturing strategy,
it determines how many remanufactured items (including the peaches and the pro-
cessed lemons) to be resold after acquiring and testing all the trade-in used products.
It is obviously reasonable to discard a lemon before the remanufacturing if it is not
eventually put back in the secondary market, so the manufacturer will be discard-
ing all the lemons before any peaches (that can in fact be resold without incurring
additional remanufacturing cost).
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Proposition 3.11 When the manufacturer adopts the Remanufacturing strategy with
the quantity choice for the resale of the remanufactured products, let xRQ and yRQ
denote the quantities of peaches and lemons that are discarded after the acquisition
and testing, then
Case I : 0 < δ < 2
2+s
Subcase RSQ1 Subcase RSQ2
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Case II with 2
2+s
≤ δ < 1 will generate similar insights as Case I presented in the
proposition and hence relegated to the Appendix. Although the manufacturer sells
both lemons and peaches under Testing but only remanufactured products under
Remanufacturing, discarding used items remains a mechanism that helps control the
volume and price of the resale products and obtain the optimal balance between
earning additional resale revenue and not causing too much cannibalization of the
new product sales. The cost of this control increases as the production cost increases
because mid-life units will be deprived of the opportunity to realize value in the
secondary market, leading to a decrease in the total discarded volume. On the other
hand, the effect of the remanufacturing cost is similar to our previous discussion
without the quantity choice: The market segmentation outcome at optimality changes
from only having new and remanufactured product buyers and inactive consumers
(with II RR and NN segments in the market) when u is very low, to only having
holders and inactive consumers (II and NH segments in the market) when u is very
high.
3.7.3 The Optimal Strategy Choice
We compare Testing and Remanufacturing, both with the quantity choice, to identify
the optimal strategy that yields the higher profit for the manufacturer and explore
how the product characteristics exert influences. We use representative numerical
examples to demonstrate the results.
The Effect of Product Durability δ
Figure 5 shows that when product durability δ is high, it is better for the man-
ufacturer to choose Remanufacturing over Testing. Recall that the remanufacturing
process incurs the unit cost of us to make up for the quality difference δs between
the lemons and peaches. Observe that δs is amplified by δ, in which case the reman-
ufacturing brings higher value-added to the products. In other words, when δ is high,
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the cost incurred for remanfucuting has a higher return, making Remanufacturing a
better strategy choice.
The Effect of Production Cost c
Figure 5(b) shows that when production cost c is high, Remanufacturing is more
likely to be the optimal strategy for the manufacturer. As we pointed out earlier,
more costly new production strengthens the manufacturer’s desire to find ways for
each product unit to better realize its market value. Such incentive drives the man-
ufacturer’s preference towards Remanufacturing, because it conducts a value-added
process to the used items to enhance their market attractiveness and value for resale.
Figure 5: Effect of product durability and production cost on optimal strategy choice,
with c = 0.8 & u = 0.3 for (a) and s = 0.5 & u = 0.3 for (b)
The Effect of Product Inferiority s
The effect of s on the choice between Testing and Remanufacturing is more com-
plicated. Remanufacturing tends to be supported over Testing by a high s when δ is
low (reprenseted by Figure 6(a)), or by a low s when δ is high (Figure 6(b)). Note
that first, a small s combined with a small δ favors the Testing strategy. The reason
is as follows: In that case, the total quality difference between lemons and peaches
(δs) is small, so the effort of remanufacturing and incurring the associated cost may
not be worthwhile, as lemons are already close alternatives to peaches and can be
directly resold, as under Testing. Second, when δs is large, resulting from a large s
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and a large δ, selling the lemons and peaches separately is again a better strategy
because with their diverse qualities, the two types of products spread further apart
and cover a larger portion of the market while not causing too much competition with
each other. Therefore, only when δs falls into a moderate range, Ramnufacturing is
the superior choice.
Figure 6: Effect of product quality inferiority on optimal strategy choice with u =
0.05, and δ = 0.2 for (a) and δ = 0.9 for (b)
3.8 Conclusions
This study takes the manufacturer’s perspective to identify the optimal strategy to
deal with the lemons problem arises in the secondary market of durable products.
A wide range of industries, such as automobiles and IT equipments, suffer from the
lemons problem that is caused by the information asymmetry on used product quality.
Offering trade-in programs has been proposed as a solution, but we point out that in
spite of its certain merits, it fails to completely resolve the problem. We delve into
the root of the lemons problem and reveal that the weakness of Trade-in is because
it only addresses the price aspect of the problem. The lemons problem, however,
involves the price mismatch between the fair price of the peaches and the buyers’
offering price, as well as the quality mismatch between the peaches and the average
products in the secondary market as perceived by the buyers. The trade-in discount
only serves as a financial incentive to narrow the price gap: It effectively increases
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the payment for consumers to also release their peaches to the market, which then
brings up the average quality and ameliorates the lemons problem.
To overcome this weakness in dealing with the lemons problem, we innovatively
propose the strategies of Testing and Remanufacturing in this paper. Interest in
these strategies is motivated by the rationale that both Testing and Remanufacutur-
ing enable the manufacturer to actively practice quality intervention with the market.
Therefore, they should each make an effective solution. We indeed confirm that both
strategies are able to fully resolve the lemons problem. Under both strategies, even
though the first-period owners still possess superior quality information, the manu-
facturer is able to divert them away from the strategic peach-holding behavior by
strategically exerting influences on both the primary and the secondary markets. No-
tably, it is exactly the testing or remanufacturing process that gains the manufacturer
the market power to enable its control over the secondary market. We present an
in-depth discussion on the underlying mechanism to explain how the quality lever
takes effect in the secondary market.
In addition to introducing and confirming Testing and Remanufacturing as effec-
tive instruments to deal with the lemons problem, we make another useful and valu-
able contribution to both the literature and the industry: We derive comprehensive
insights on how firms can optimally choose between Testing and Remanufacutring,
as well as how the characteristics of their products, such as the product durability,
the quality difference between used items, and the production cost, should be ac-
counted for. Beyond providing thorough understanding of the lemons problem and
the solutions on the conceptual level, the results and the discussion in this paper also
form a rich foundation for empirical study that embeds with substantial potential to
generate more detailed strategic guidance for specific industries.
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CHAPTER IV
A FRAMEWORK FOR EMPIRICALLY STUDYING
SECONDARY MARKET STRATEGIES
4.1 Introduction
Secondary markets of durable products carry the important role of offering trade
opportunities that allow consumers who are willing to pay the higher price for new
replacements to offload their used products, and channel these items to other con-
sumers as lower-price alternative purchase options. The effectiveness of this realloca-
tion function of the secondary market, however, could be dampened by the lemons
problem: First, the value depreciation of used products can vary significantly across
units, either due to the production defects that only show up after usage or the pre-
vious use patterns of the original owners. In the secondary market, the sellers, being
the original product owners, have superior information about the residual qualities
of the units for sales. However, due to the nature of trade (i.e., that products are
sold by individuals rather than the manufacturer), the sellers typically cannot cred-
ibly communicate the quality information when the information is not observable to
buyers prior to purchase. As a result of the asymmetric information, buyers are only
willing to offer a price based on the average market quality. This price will be lower
than the fair price of a high-quality used product (a peach) and higher than that of
a low-quality one (a lemon). Consequently, the owners are incentivized to follow the
strategic peach-holding behavior, i.e., to sell the lemons but hold on to the peaches,
resulting in a secondary market filled with more lemons than peaches. Although the
sellers may reap benefit from the lemons problem when they sell the lemons above
the fair price, buyers may be over-charged. As a result, the secondary market fails
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to properly match products of different qualities to consumers with different product
valuations, and the resulting market dynamics bring down the average market qual-
ity and hence suppress trade activities. This motivates the research question of the
paper: Is there a way for the manufacturer to take an active role in the secondary
market and design strategies to resolve the lemons problem?
Used automobile markets provide an interesting context to study this problem
for multiple reasons. First, automobiles have active and well-established secondary
markets, with a total trade volume well exceeding new production. Second, the
lemons problem has long been documented in these markets. Third, manufacturers
of automobiles have constructed different approaches and strategies for the secondary
markets of their products to tackle the lemons problem, which facilitates rich research
on the topic. Specifically, we can compare and study the impacts of different Certified
Pre-Owned (CPO) programs offered by the manufacturers that resell used vehicles
after inspection and reconditioning. Based on our results, we will also derive guidance
on the optimal designs of the CPO programs for the manufacturers of products with
different characteristics. In the literature, used vehicle markets have been utilized
to study certain characteristics of the lemons problem. For example, Peterson and
Schneider (2016) demonstrate that there exists an inverse relation between observed
and unobserved qualities in the sales of used cars. Beyond that, these markets also
provide the empirical evidence for exploring other topics of the secondary market
of durable products, such as how the different incentives to trade lead to different
trade patterns (Esteban and Shum, 2007), and the effect of transaction cost on the
secondary and primary markets (Gavazza et al., 2014).
In the literature, trade-in programs have been proposed to be able to alleviate
the lemons problem. These programs offer a discount on the new product price for
consumers who trade in the used items upon the purchase of new ones, and then sell
the used items as-is into the secondary market (Rao et al., 2009). Huang et al. (2016)
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further delve into the root of the lemons problem and point out that: The lemons
problem, caused by the quality information asymmetry, involves both a (quality)
mismatch between the peach-quality and the average market quality expected by the
buyers, as well as a (price) mismatch between the fair price of peaches demanded by
the sellers and the buying price offered by buyers. The trade-in programs are only
able to utilize the price lever to close the price mismatch, but are ineffective about
the quality aspect of the problem. Therefore, it is not strong enough to completely
eliminate the lemons problem. In addition to explaining the weakness of the trade-in
programs, the paper proposes the strategy of Testing or Remanufacturing as more
effective solutions. The former is referring to the fact that the manufacturer, after
acquiring the trade-in used products, conducts testing to identify the product qual-
ity, and then resells the lemons and the peaches separately in the secondary market.
The latter is referring to the fact that the manufacturer remanufactures the prod-
ucts after testing for the resale. The key underlying working mechanism for both
strategies is to enable the manufacturer to actively address the quality aspect of the
problem, by either finding a way to credibly communicate the quality information to
the market (e.g., selling products of different qualities separately as under Testing),
or by removing the quality differences through additional product processing (e.g., as
under Remanufacturing). In doing so, the manufacturer gains stronger control over
the secondary market, with which it can now strategically influence pricing jointly in
both the primary and the secondary markets. Eventually, these strategies deter the
strategic peach-holding behavior and eliminate the lemons problem.
A closer scrutiny of the CPO programs suggests its connection to the existing
research and hence the suitability of this choice of context for our study. The first
CPO program was launched by Mercedes-Benz in the early 1990s, designed to free
buyers of used vehicles from the worry of getting lemon cars and to enhance the resale
value. This function of CPO programs soon earned popularity among most major
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manufacturers. For a used vehicle to qualify for CPO in resale, it has to meet certain
qualification criteria determined by each manufacturer, typically including specifica-
tions of the age and the mileage of the car. For example, the qualification criteria for
Lexus is that the car has to be less than six years and within 70,000 miles. Vehicles
that fail the criteria cannot be sold under CPO, in which case they may be sold as-is.
The qualified ones will then go through inspection and reconditioning following an-
other set of vehicle criteria. Taking Lexus for example again, the criteria include a
161-point inspection and fixing identified problems up to a certain standard. More-
over, the manufacturer also chooses what warranty to offer for the CPO vehicles. As
such, the CPO can be regarded as a strategy that effectively lies somewhere between
the Testing and the Remanufacturing strategies we mentioned: Selling vehicles with
CPO resembles the sales of the peaches and selling those without CPO is similar to
the sales of lemons under the Testing strategy. When the qualification criteria of the
manufacturer are set to be loose such that most used vehicles will eventually be sold
with CPO, then the manufacturer is approximately following the Remanufacturing
strategy. Establishing this connection, we can use the empirical evidence from the car
industry to test the results of the effectiveness and the optimal choice of the strategies
in resolving the lemons problem for Testing and Remanufacturing.
4.2 Hypothesis Development
In this section, we draw upon results from Huang et al. (2016) to develop testable
hypotheses for the empirical study.
One of the main contributions of the paper is to show that both Testing and Re-
manufacturing remove the strategic peach-holding behavior and resolve the lemons
problem. Notably, under the strategies of Testing and Remanufacturing, the lemons
problem no longer exists in the used product resale, because the manufacturer dis-
closes the product qualities either by selling products of different qualities separately
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or by ensuring quality uniformity through conducting remanufacturing. However, the
lemons problem could in fact persist in the market because when the original owners
of the products first release the used products into the market (i.e., to manufacturers
through trade-ins), they still possess superior quality information that is unknown to
the manufacturer, which propagates the strategic peach-holding behavior. In light of
this, the results in the paper are revealing as they prove that the strategies of Testing
and Remanufacturing, by enabling the manufacturer to gain a stronger control over
the secondary market, are capable of completely deterring the first-period owners
from strategic peach-holding and hence resolve the lemons problem. These results
form the foundation for our first hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1: The average quality of used products sold into the secondary
market increases when CPO programs are offered.
In addition to exploring Testing and Remanufacturing as solutions to the lemons
problem, Huang et al. (2016) also derive a set of conclusions for the optimal strat-
egy choice between Testing and Remanufacturing, based on which we establish the
hypotheses below.
As discussed earlier, when the manufacturer sells some of the used vehicles with
CPO along with a significant portion without (e.g., those fail the qualification crite-
ria), then the manufacturer effectively follows a strategy that resembles Testing. In
contrast, when the majority of the resale vehicles come with CPO, then it is more
likely that the manufacturer adopts a strategy that is similar to Remanufacturing.
Therefore, we infer whether the manufacturer is more likely adopting Testing or Re-
manufacturing from the following defined portion:
portion =
volume of resale vehicles with CPO
volume of resale vehicles with CPO + volume of resale vehicles without CPO
where the value of the portion close to 1 stands for Remanufacturing, and Testing
otherwise. A strict alignment with the analytical framework and results in Huang
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et al. (2016) would mean that all the “resale vehicles” in the equation refer to the
ones sold by the dealer. An alternative formulation of the portion for our empirical
study could be to also capture the volume of used vehicles privately traded among
consumers. We will be making the choice depending on the availability and the
characteristics of the data.
Huang et al. (2016) point out that when the vehicles are more durable, it scales up
the relative quality difference between peaches and lemons and results in a higher total
quality difference. In that case, conducting remanufacturing that makes up the quality
deficiency of lemons will bring in a higher value-added. As such, Remanufacture will
be the more favorable strategy for the manufacturer to improve profitability. Building
on this, we construct Hypothesis 2.
Hypothesis 2: The portion of used vehicles sold with CPO increases with
the vehicle durability.
Huang et al. (2016) also demonstrate that the manufacturer is better-off with
Remanufacturing than Testing when the production cost is high. The underlying
rationale is that when production is more costly, the manufacturer would want to
guarantee that each unit of production is indeed worthwhile and generates sufficient
return. Therefore, the manufacturer has stronger incentives to enhance the product
resale value in the secondary market. Since the resale value can be better realized by
selling after remanufacturing, the manufacturer’s tendency to follow Remanufactur-
ing, captured by the portion of CPO vehicles, should increase in the production cost.
This result translates into the hypothesis below.
Hypothesis 3: The portion of used vehicles sold with CPO increases with
the unit production cost.
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The relative quality difference between peaches and lemons can be captured by
the product reliability that, when multiplied with the product durability, measures
the total quality difference. When the product is low (with a low reliability and a
low durability), lemons are already close alternatives to peaches in the market. In
this case, it is better for the manufacturer to simply sell the lemons without remanu-
facuting and incurring the additional associated cost; i.e., Testing is a better choice.
In contrast, when the product is high (with a high reliability and a high durability),
selling peaches and lemons separately is again superior for maximizing manufacturer
profit: In this case, the peaches and lemons together, with their diverse qualities, are
able to achieve a wide market coverage without causing too much competition among
themselves. Therefore, only when the product of reliability and durability falls into
a moderate range (a low reliability accompanied with a high durability, or a high
reliability combined with a low durability), Remanufacturering should be chosen, as
stated in the hypotheses below.
Hypothesis 4a: The portion of used vehicles sold with CPO increases with
reliability for low-durability vehicles.
Hypothesis 4b: The portion of used vehicles sold with CPO decreases with
reliability for high-durability vehicles.
4.3 Key Characteristics of the Empirical Setting
In this section, we discuss the measures of some of the key variables in the problem.
Product Durability: In the durable goods literature, durability is typically cap-
tured by the value depreciation of the product during the later stage of its useful life,
compared to a new unit (Desai and Purohit 1998, Huang et al. 2001). This measure
can be obtained by studying the prices of used vehicles of different ages, from sources
such as Kelly Blue Book (Rao et al. 2009).
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Product Reliability: Product reliability captures the quality differences among
used vehicles and hence can be measured by the consumer ratings, for example, avail-
able from Consumer Reports magazine (Rao et al. 2009). Alternatively, since the
lower-quality used cars are more likely to be associated with more frequent break-
downs or failure. Therefore, repair records such as the repair rate or the associated
repair expenditure, also included in Consumer Reports can be another measure of
product reliability (Porter and Sattler, 1999).
Production Cost: One way to approximately interpolate the production cost is to
first collect information on invoice price at which the manufacturer sells the vehicles
to dealers, and then factor in the profit margin of the manufacturer, which will be
available from the annual financial reports of the manufacturers.
Remanufacturing Cost: For some of the CPO programs, the dealer announces
a fee for undertaking (or contracting with auto-shops for) the inspection and the
reconditioning processes for the manufacturer. This fee could be a proxy for the
remanufacturing cost. To further improve accuracy, this value may also be adjusted
by the expected cost associated with the specific warranty offer.
4.4 Discussion
In his seminal paper, Akerlof demonstrates that the lemons problem can be so detri-
mental that it shuts down trade activities in the secondary market completely (Ak-
erlof, 1970). Hendel and Lizzeri, (2002) later argue that part of the used product
trade can survive the lemons problem because there will always be consumers who
want to sell off used products for replacement purchases of new ones. Even in that
case, however, the emergence of the lemons problem remains highly undesired for
the secondary market. In a recent research, Huang et al. (2016) propose that the
strategies of Testing and Remanufacturing can be effective solutions to the lemons
problem, and the paper further provides guidance on how manufacturers of different
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products should optimally choose from these options. Our paper empirically stud-
ies these strategies given their significant value in the market. One potential of our
research is to find practical evidence to support the theoretical results and enhance
their validity. We choose the markets of used automobiles for our pursuit as they
have long been haunted by the lemons problem. Moreover, the car manufacturers
have developed and widely adopted CPO programs to improve the resale value of
used vehicles in the existence of the lemons problem. These programs share similar
characteristics with the Testing and Remanufacturing strategies of interest because
they enable the manufacturers to actively interfere with the qualities of products in
the resale. The CPO programs typically include qualification criteria, and sequential
inspection and reconditioning, along with additional warranty, based on the vehicle
criteria; and both the qualification and vehicle criteria are set by the individual man-
ufacturer. Therefore, the used vehicle context provides a rich discussion ground for
our study.
It is very interesting to observe the following in practice: Although the structures
of the CPO programs are similar, the actual specifications of the qualification and
vehicle criteria vary significantly across manufacturers. Therefore, another potential
contribution of this paper is to provide insights on the incentives of manufacturers
for making different choices in the details of the CPO programs. Building on that,
we can also generate concrete suggestions on instructing the optimal designs of the
CPO programs and offer strong theoretical support for informed decision making.
For example, the results can provide guidance on whether manufacturers of vehicles
that are different in their durability, production cost and product reliability should
choose less or more strict qualification criteria to properly control the portion of the
used vehicles to be resold under CPO for enhancing the overall profitability.
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APPENDIX A
PROOFS OF CHAPTER II
Proof of Lemma 2.1
Under the recycling target R and the collection target λ imposed by legislation, the
producer solves the following maximization problem:
max
p,r
= Π(p, r; ρ, δ) = (1 − θ1)
(
p− g(ρ, δ) + λ(−1
2
βr2 + (α + ρ)r)
)
,
subject to: R ≤ r ≤ 1, 1 − θ1 ≥ 0, θ1 − θ2 ≥ 0, θ2 ≥ 0, pu ≥ 0.
The market clearing condition 1 − θ1 = θ1 − θ2 means θ1 − θ2 ≥ 0 is redundant as
we keep 1 − θ1 ≥ 0. Furthermore, consumer θ2 (by definition) is indifferent between
choosing Bn or Bu, i.e., δθ2 − pu = 0, yielding θ2 = puδ . Hence pu ≥ 0 is redundant
as we retain θ2 ≥ 0. Therefore, the full set of constraints to analyze the problem is
1 − r ≥ 0, r − R ≥ 0, 1 − θ1 ≥ 0 and θ2 ≥ 0. Substituting the expressions of θ1






≥ 0, which are equivalent to 1 + δ− p ≥ 0 and 2p− 1 + δ ≥ 0 since 1 + 3δ ≥ 0.
We associate Lagrange multipliers with all the constraints to form the Lagrangian for
maximization.
L = − 1
1+3δ
(p− (1 + δ))
(
p− g(ρ, δ) + λ(−1
2
βr2 + (α + ρ)r)
)
+ λ1(1 − r) + λ2(r)
+λ3(1 + δ − p) + λ4(2p + δ − 1).






















((α+ ρ)− βr)− λ1 + λ2
There are 9 possible cases (excluding inconsistent cases such as the one with both
1 − r = 0 and r −R = 0).
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1 − r > 0 = 0 = 0 > 0 > 0 = 0 > 0 > 0 > 0
r −R > 0 > 0 > 0 = 0 = 0 > 0 = 0 > 0 > 0
1 + δ − p > 0 = 0 > 0 > 0 = 0 > 0 > 0 = 0 > 0
2p− (1 − δ) > 0 > 0 = 0 = 0 > 0 > 0 > 0 > 0 = 0
We analyze each of them below, and we suppress the arguments of g(ρ, δ) for
brevity.
(1) In this case, λ1 = λ2 = λ3 = λ4 = 0. Substituting them into the first-order





(1 + δ + g− λ (α+ρ)2
2β
). Moreover, the resulting Hessian is negative definite,
confirming this pair of values to be a local maximizer.





(1 − δ) ≤ p = 1
2
(1 + δ + g − λ (α+ρ)2
2β
) ≤ 1 + δ. Simplifications reduce
them to 0 ≤ α + ρ ≤ β and −(1 + δ − g) ≤ λ (α+ρ)2
2β
≤ (g + 2δ). Note that
the latter inequality always holds because λ (α+ρ)
2
2β
is the effective unit recycling
value at r = α+ρ
β
, which has to be lower than the unit production cost, otherwise
it leads to the unreasonable case where the producer can generate a steady




≤ g ≤ g + 2δ. Moreover, 1 + δ − g + λ (α+ρ)2
2β
is the unit profit for
the producer (accounting for both the production cost and the recycling value),
which has to be non-negative to keep the producer in the market, and hence
−(1 + δ − g) ≤ λ (α+ρ)2
2β
.
(2) In this case, r = 1 and p = 1 + δ, which lead to zero production and zero profit.
This uninteresting case is discarded.
(3) In this case, r = 1 and p = 1−δ
2









However, λ4 < 0 because λ(−12β + (α + ρ)) < g < g + 2δ, with the LHS being
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the effective unit recycling value at r = 1 that is lower than the unit production
cost. Therefore, this candidate solution is invalid and hence discarded.
(4) In this case, r = R and p = 1−δ
2









However, similar to Case (3), λ4 < 0 and hence this candidate solution is dis-
carded.
(5) In this case, r = R and p = 1+δ, which lead to zero production and zero profit.
This uninteresting case is discarded.
(6) In this case, r = 1 and p = 1
2
(1 + δ + g − λ((α + ρ) − 1
2
β)). To ensure the
validity of this candidate solution, we need λ1 =
α+ρ−β
1+3δ
≥ 0 and 1
2
(1− δ) ≤ p =
1
2
(1 + δ + g−λ((α+ ρ)− 1
2
β)) ≤ 1 + δ, with the latter inequality being satisfied
following an argument similar to that in Case (1).
(7) In this case, r = R and p = 1
2
(1 + δ + g − λ((α + ρ)R− 1
2
βR2)). To ensure the
validity of this candidate solution, we need λ2 =
βR−(α+ρ)
1+3δ
≥ 0 and 1
2
(1 − δ) ≤
p = 1
2
(1 + δ + g−λ((α+ ρ)R− 1
2
βR2)) ≤ 1 + δ, with the latter inequality begin
satisfied following an argument similar to that in Case (1).
(8) In this case, p = 1 + δ, which lead to zero production and zero profit and hence
this uninteresting case is discarded.
(9) In this case, r = α+ρ
β
and p = 1−δ
2





< 0 and hence this candidate solution is discarded.
Finally, the optimal new product price and recycling level are summarized below.
(i) When α+ρ
β
≤ R (ii) When R ≤ α+ρ
β
≤ 1 (iii) When 1 ≤ α+ρ
β
r∗(δ, ρ) = R r∗(δ, ρ) = α+ρ
β
r∗(δ, ρ) = 1
p∗ = 1
2
(1 + δ + g − λ((α+ β)R− 1
2
βR2)) p∗ = 1
2
(1 + δ + g − λ
(α+ρ)2
2β
) p∗ = 1
2
(1 + δ + g − λ((α+ β)− 1
2
β))
Equivalently, the optimal price is p∗(ρ, δ) = 1
2
(1 + δ + g(ρ, δ)−λ(−1
2
β(r∗(ρ, δ))2 +
(α + ρ)r∗(ρ, δ))).
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Proof of Proposition 2.2
By backward induction, we study ρ∗ and δ∗ in three cases, corresponding to the
three cases of p∗ and r∗ in Lemma 1. In solving this problem, we start with a general
value of d, and then focus on the case of d = 0.
Case(i) When α+ρ
β
≤ R. The producer is faced with the following optimization problem:
max
ρ,δ









subject to: 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1, ρ ≥ 0, α + ρ ≤ Rβ.





1 + δ −m− τρ2 − dρδ − bδ2 + λ((α+ ρ)R− 12βR2)
)2
+ µ1(1− δ) + µ2(δ)
+µ3(Rβ − α− ρ) + µ4(ρ).




























−3(1 + δ −m− τρ2 − dρδ − bδ2 + λ((α+ ρ)R−
1
2
βR2)) + 2(1 + 3δ)(1− dρ− 2bδ)
)
− µ1 + µ2.
Note that (1 + δ−m− τρ2− dρδ− bδ2 +λ((α+ ρ)R− 1
2
βR2)) is the unit profit
and hence should be non-negative. There are 3 candidate solutions for ρ∗.
(1) ρ = βR− α. To ensure ρ = βR− α ≥ 0 and µ3 ≥ 0 for the validity of the
candidate solution, the associated constraint is βR− Rλ−dδ
2τ
≤ α ≤ βR.
(2) ρ = 0. To ensure µ4 ≥ 0, the associated constraint is Rλ ≤ dδ.
(3) ρ = Rλ−dδ
2τ





Case(ii) When R ≤ α+ρ
β













subject to 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1, ρ ≥ 0, βR ≤ α ≤ β.





1 + δ −m− τρ2 − dρδ − bδ2 + λ (α+ρ)2
2β
)2
+ µ1(1 − δ) + µ2(δ)
+µ3(β − α− ρ) + µ4(ρ) + µ5(α + ρ−Rβ).






























−3(1 + δ −m− τρ2 − dρδ − bδ2 + λ
(α+ ρ)2
2β
) + 2(1 + 3δ)(1− dρ− 2bδ)
)
− µ1 + µ2.
Note that (1 + δ −m− τρ2 − dρδ − bδ2 + λ (α+ρ)2
2β
) is the unit profit and hence
should be non-negative. There are 4 candidate solutions for ρ∗.
(1) ρ = 0. The associated constraints to ensure the validity of the candidate
solution are Rβ − α ≤ ρ = 0 ≤ β − α and µ1 ≥ 0, which reduce to
βR ≤ α ≤ β and λα
β
≤ dδ.
(2) ρ = βR − α. The associated constraints are ρ = βR − α ≥ 0 and µ3 ≥ 0,
which reduce to α ≤ βR and 2α−R(2βτ − λ) ≤ dδ.
(3) ρ = β − α. The associated constraints are ρ = β − α ≥ 0 and µ2 ≥ 0,
which reduce to α ≤ β and dδ ≤ 2ατ − (2βτ − λ).
(4) ρ = αλ−βdβ
2βτ−1
. The associated constraints are max[0, Rβ − α] ≤ ρ ≤ β − α,
which reduce to
• α ≤ βR and 2ατ − (2βτ − λ) ≤ dδ ≤ 2ατ −R(2βτ − λ); or




Case(iii) When 1 ≤ α+ρ
β
. The producer is faced with the following optimization problem:
max
ρ,δ









subject to 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1, ρ ≥ 0, α+ ρ ≥ β.






































−3(1 + δ −m− τρ2 − dρδ − bδ2 + λ((α+ ρ)−
1
2
β)) + 2(1 + 3δ)(1− dρ− 2bδ)
)
− µ1 + µ2.
Note that (1 + δ −m − τρ2 − dρδ − bδ2 + λ((α + ρ) − 1
2
β)) is the unit profit
and hence should be non-negative. There are 3 candidate solutions for ρ∗.
(1) ρ = 0. The associated constraints to ensure the validity of the candidate
solution are β ≤ α and dδ ≥ λ.
(2) ρ = β − α. The associated constraints are α ≤ min[β, β − λ−dδ
2τ
].
(3) ρ = λ−dδ
2τ
. The associated constraints are
• α ≤ β and β − λ−dδ
2τ
≤ α; or
• β ≤ α and dδ ≤ λ.




dδ ≤ 2ατ − (2βτ − λ) 2ατ − (2βτ − λ) ≤
dδ ≤ 2ατ−R(2βτ−λ)
2ατ −R(2βτ − λ) ≤
dδ ≤ Rλ
Rλ ≤ dδ





ρ = β − α ρ = αλ−dβδ
2βτ−λ
ρ = Rβ − α ρ = Rβ − α
r∗ = 1 ρ = λ−dδ
2τ
ρ = β − α ρ = β − α ρ = β − α











ρ = β − α ρ = αλ−dβδ
2βτ−λ
ρ = 0
r∗ = 1 ρ = λ−dδ
2τ
ρ = 0 ρ = 0
(iii) 1 ≤ α
β
.
dδ ≤ λ λ ≤ dδ
r∗ = 1 ρ = λ−dδ
2τ
ρ = 0
Next, we need to eliminate the dominated candidate solutions. To this end, we
compare the profits resulting from the candidate solutions listed in the same column
because they are the valid candidate solutions under the same condition (excluding
the first column which simply shows the corresponding recycling level r∗). The op-
timal solution derived from the comparisons, after an equivalent transformation, is





2ατ − (2βτ − λ)
2ατ − (2βτ −
λ) ≤ dδ ≤
2ατ−R(2βτ−λ)
2ατ −R(2βτ −









(ii) R ≤ α
β
≤ 1.










(iii) 1 ≤ α
β
.





In the special case where there is no durability-recyclability interaction, i.e., d = 0,
the General Solution reduces to the following one, presented with the corresponding
recycling level and producer profit.
(Ri) When α ≤ R(β − λ2τ ) (Rii) When
R(β − λ2τ ) ≤ α ≤ β − λ2τ
(Riii) When β − λ2τ ≤ α
ρ∗ = Rλ2τ , with r
∗ = R and ρ∗ = αλ2βτ−λ , with r
∗ = 2ατ2βτ−λ and ρ
∗ = λ2τ , with r

















These results are summarized in Proposition 2.2.
Proof of Proposition 2.3
To prove Proposition 2.3, we start by stating Lemma A.2.
Lemma A.2 For a given durability δ, the producer’s profit at the optimal recyclability
choice can be written as
Π(δ) =








1 −m + λ(Rα− 2βτ−λ
4τ
R2) when α ≤ R(β − λ
2τ
)
1 −m + λ α2τ
2βτ−1
when R(β − λ
2τ
) ≤ α ≤ β − λ
2τ








Proof: The lemma follows from Proposition 1 by rearranging the terms of the profit
function.










A+ δ − bδ2
)
(−2 + 3A+ δ(−3 + b(4 + 9δ)))
4(1 + 3δ)2













Note that δa,b ∈ R with δb ≥ 0 and δa ≤ 0. Moreover, since δb can be shown to
be a minimizer, both δb and δa are eliminated as optimal solution. When δc,d /∈ R,
then the profit maximizing solution δ∗ can only take the value of 0 or 1, at the
boundaries. The optimal solution can be selected by comparing the profits at δ = 0
and δ = 1. When δc,d ∈ R, by pairwise comparisons, we can determine the relative
relation between the δi’s to be δc ≤ δa ≤ δd ≤ δb; hence the optimal δ∗ can only take
the value of 0, 1 or δd. The optimal solution can be selected by comparing the profits





































1 if A < A(b),















These results are summarized in Proposition 2.
Proof of Proposition 2.4
To prove Proposition 2.4, we start by stating Lemma A.3.
Lemma A.3 When d 6= 0, the optimal recyclability choice (and the correspond-
ing optimal recycling level) can be summarized below, with δ1=̇1
d
(2ατ − (2βτ − λ)),
δ2=̇1
d






λ) and δ5=̇ 1
d
(λ).











r∗ = R r∗ = 2ατ−dδ
2βτ−λ
r∗ = 1
Π(δ) = Π1(δ) Π(δ) = Π2(δ) Π(δ) = Π3(δ)












Π(δ) = Π2(δ) Π(δ) = Π3(δ)












(Pi1) when δ ≤ δ1 (Pi2) when δ1 ≤ δ ≤ δ2 (Pi3) when δ2 ≤ δ ≤ δ3 (Pi4) when δ3 ≤ δ
ρ∗ = λ−dδ2τ ρ
∗ = αλ−dβδ2βτ−λ ρ
∗ = Rλ−dδ2τ ρ
∗ = 0
r∗ = 1 r∗ = 2ατ−dδ2βτ−λ r
∗ = R r∗ = R
Π(δ) = Π3(δ) Π(δ) = Π2(δ) Π(δ) = Π1(δ) Π(δ) = Π4(δ)
(ii) When R ≤ α
β
≤ 1.










Π(δ) = Π3(δ) Π(δ) = Π2(δ) Π(δ) = Π5(δ)
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(iii) When 1 ≤ α
β
.




r∗ = 1 r∗ = 1
Π(δ) = Π3(δ) Π(δ) = Π6(δ)
Proof: These results can be derived by adapting the General Solution to the cases
with d < 0 and d > 0. The lemma fully characterizes ρ∗ for d 6= 0, paralleling
Proposition 1 for d = 0.
Based on Lemma 3, the profit function can be rewritten as
Πj(δ) =
(δ − bjδ2 + Aj)2(Fj)2
4(1 + 3δ)
, (A2)




























j = 4 1 −m + (Rα− R2β
2
)λ b 1
j = 5 1 −m + α2λ
2β
b 1
j = 6 1 −m + (α− β
2
)λ b 1
Since we can unify the profit function into Equation (A2), which has a simi-
lar structure as Equation (A1), the solution in Proposition 2 applies. That means
for Π(δ) = Πj(δ), the optimal δ in this case (denoted by δ
∗
j ) takes the value of
arg maxδ Π(δ) as specified in Proposition 2 with A = Aj and b = bj. Then the op-
timal solution can be identified to be the δ∗j that yields the highest profit across the
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different j cases. To be specific,










j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} when α
β
≤ R
j ∈ {2, 3, 5} when R ≤ α
β
≤ 1
j ∈ {3, 6} when 1 ≤ α
β
.
Proof of Proposition 2.5
Based on the closed-form solutions of δ∗ and ρ∗ from Proposition 1–3 and Lemma 3,







≥ 0 and ∂ρ∗
∂λ
≥ 0 when d ≤ 0. Details are
omitted for brevity.
Proof of Proposition 2.6
This result is derived from the closed-form solution of δ∗ for d > 0 from Proposition
3 and its proof, based on which we can calculate ∂δ
∗
∂R
. Note that all the thresholds Rdl
and Rd are in closed-form. They are omitted for brevity.
Proof of Proposition 2.7
This result is derived from the closed-form solution of ρ∗ for d > 0 from Lemma 3 and








Rr and Rrr are also found in closed-form but omitted for brevity.
Proof of Proposition 2.8
This result is derived from the closed-form solution of δ∗ for d > 0 from Proposition
3 and its proof, based on which we can calculate ∂δ
∗
∂λ
. Note that the threshold λd is
found in closed-form but omitted for brevity.
Proof of Proposition 2.9
This result is derived from the closed-form solution of ρ∗ for d > 0 from Lemma 3
and its proof, based on which we can calculate ∂ρ
∗
∂λ
. The thresholds λrl and λr are
found in closed-form but omitted for brevity.
Profitable Recycling and Competition for Cores
In order to elicit returns, the producer and the third parties offer respective buyback
options to consumers for the cores. Such buyback options can take various forms
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including trade-in discounts, coupons, checks or cash. Denote the unit buyback price
offered by the producer as p0 and the one offered by the i-th third parties as pi (regard-
less of the product condition). We assume all the n third parties are homogeneous,
so as to obtain insights while keeping the analysis tractable.
While the producer is assumed to have a large enough capacity to accept and
recycle all the returns that arrive, a third party only has a limited capacity that can
accept and recycle a fraction k (0 ≤ k ≤ 1) of all the end-of-life products. When
the aggregate third-party capacity covers the whole collection and recycling volume,
k = 1/n.
We construct a model similar to the one in Arnold (2001) and solve the problem
by first looking at the consumers’ return strategy. When all the consumers are risk
neutral, there exists a symmetric mixed strategy for consumers represented by π =
{π0, π1, · · · , πn} such that in every attempt to return the core, a consumer chooses
the producer and the i-th third party with probabilities π0 and πi (i = 1, · · · , n),
respectively. Given this strategy, in every period, a portion πi of the total returns
arrive at the i-th third party. Each of these recyclers accept returns up to capacity.
Then they start recycling and stop accepting returns during a time period Y , which
is assumed to be exponentially distributed with parameter µ and hence E(Y ) = 1/µ.
Without loss of generality, we assume µ = 1 in the following analysis (the actual value
of µ is not a critical assumption). We assume the arrivals of returns follow a Poison
process at a rate of πiq where q is the total volume of the cores. Therefore, the period
of time that the third party is able to accept returns (i.e., the time period before the
returns reach the capacity) is the sum of exponentially distributed random variables





. The collection (when returns are accepted) and recycling phases
form an alternating renewal process. Following standard results from alternating
renewal process, the probability that the third party has available capacity to buy
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for i = 1, 2, ..., n. For the
producer, α0 = 1 since it is able to accept any returns that arrive.
For consumers who adopt the strategy π = {π0, · · · , πn}, the expected payoff is
U = π0(p0 − s) +
∑n
1 πi(αipi + (1−αi)U − s). In order for π = {π0, · · · , πn} to be an
equilibrium consumer strategy, it must hold that U = p0− s = αi(pi) + (1−αi)U − s.
Solving it yields: pi−p0 = sπik , where pi−p0 can be regarded as the price premium the
third party has to offer over the producer to compensate the consumers for a possible
out-of-capacity situation. Note that πi, the probability that the i-th third party will
be chosen in the equilibrium consumer strategy, increases in the third party’s recycling
capacity (leading to a lower out-of-capacity probability, i.e., higher service rate) and
the price premium, but decreases in the consumers’ searching cost.
For the i-th third party, the actual amount of returns that it is able to accept
is αj portion of all the returns that arrive. The third party chooses a buyback
price pi to maximize its profit from buying back and recycling the end-of-life prod-
uct returns: Profiti = (w − pi)(απiq). Solving the maximization problem yields
p∗i = p0 +
√
s2 + (w − p0)s− s. Consequently, when the aggregate third party capac-
ity covers the whole collection and recycling volume, the buyback price the producer
needs to offer to ensure collection of a λ portion (i.e., π0 = λ) of end-of-life products
for compliance will be pλ = w − s((2 − λ)2 − 1).
Proof of Proposition 2.10
When v(R, 0) > 0 and d > 0, we can solve for the closed-form ρ∗ and δ∗ that
maximizes the producer profit in this case, following a similar procedure as above.
Then we can prove that ∂δ
∗
∂λ
≤ 0 and ∂ρ∗
∂λ
≥ 0 for 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1.
Proof of Proposition 2.11





|ρ=ρ∗,δ=δ∗ , with ρ∗ and
δ∗ as specified earlier. Based on the resulting expression of the new production






. All the thresholds in the
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proposition are in closed-form but omitted for brevity.
Details of Calibrated Numerical Study
We first derive the values of αj + ρj and βj for both the c-Si (j = 1) and CIGS
(j = 2) technologies by using the recycling data. The processing cost is estimated
to be c = $200/ton based on recent data (Choi and Fthemakis 2014, Fthenakis and
Moskowitz 1999, BIO 2011), and it is comparable for both of the technologies. To
convert it into c1 and c2 in terms of $/kW, we use the average weight of 102 kg/kW
and 200 kg/kW for the c-Si and CIGS technologies, respectively (Okopol 2007). Next
we collect data on the material components of PVPs, as well as the recovery rates
and market prices of all the composition elements. Note that the market prices are
corresponding to a 100% purity level, which may not always be achieved by the current
recycling technologies. Therefore, the actual values of the recovered materials may
be lower but these values are good approximations. The table shown in Figure A7
summarizes the data (Cucchiella et al. 2015, BIO 2011), note that it only reflects the
recoverable material values but has not yet captured the processing cost.
Figure A7: The material composition of different PVPs.
We can now calculate the recycling levels (rm1 and rm2) that only account for the
recoverable material values in the following way: For every composition element, mul-
tiply its percentage of the total weight by its recovery rate, and then sum over all the
elements of the panel. We can also derive the unit recycling material values vmj in the
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following way: For each element, multiply its percentage of the total weight by the av-
erage weight of the panel, then multiply the result by the market price, and sum over
all the elements of the panel. Next, let αmj + ρj represent the highest marginal recy-
cling value of the product that only accounts for the recoverable material value, given
the recyclability of the technology. Then based on rmj = min{1,max{αmj+ρjβj , 0}}
and vmj = −12βjr2mj + (αmj + ρj)r2mj, we can calculate αmj + ρj and βj for both the
technologies, by βj =
2vmj
r2mj






< 1). Now we incor-
porate the processing cost in the estimation. Note that the processing cost applies to
all the recycled components of the panel. Therefore, the unit recycling value vj0 after
accounting for the processing cost (we use the additional subscript “0” for the values
in the baseline case without legislation) should be the unit recycling material value
net of the processing cost; i.e., vj0 = vmj − cj. We assume the processing cost applies
in a uniform manner to the recycled components and hence βj remains unchanged.
Substituting the relevant data into the equations, we arrive at the following results:
β1 = 0.08 and β2 = 0.112; v10 = 8.3 and v20 = 10. Then we can also solve for rj0 and





j + (αj + ρj)rj. The
results are: r10 = 0.455 and r20 = 0.424; α1 + ρ1 = 0.0366 and α2 + ρ2 = 0.0476.
Next, we show how the Xj values are recovered from the market data. First, we
collect data on the current prices of PVPs and the production costs: p1 = $1.75 ×
103/kW, p2 = $2.1 × 103/kW, g1 = $1.05 × 103/kW and g2 = $1.5 × 103/kW (ISET
2010, Reddy 2012). In the baseline case where legislation is absent, when consumer
types are distributed in the generalized range of [0, Xj ], we re-solve our model in
a similar way as before and derive pj =
1
2




, and calculations give X1 = 1.26 × 103 and X2 = 1.43 × 103.
Next, based on the generalization of our model (with Xj), the producer profit in




, whereas the profit in the legislated case




with rj = max{R, rj0} and vj = −12βj(rj)2 + (αj + ρj)rj
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. Figure 4 shows how the regions defined by min{∆Π1,∆Π2} shift
as we vary the processing cost from the benchmark value $200/ton to $185/ton (as
shown by the dashed lines moving downwards).
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APPENDIX B
PROOFS OF CHAPTER III
Proof of Proposition 3.6
Depending on their type θ, each consumer self-selects into adopting one of the non-
dominated strategies. Accordingly, the market will be divided into segments of con-
sumers choosing different strategies. However, the market segmentation outcomes
cannot be determined upfront, because they depend on the prices, which in return
are determined by the manufacturer based on the market segment sizes. To solve
this problem, we first exhaust all the possible segmentation outcomes. Then for
each of these cases, we find the corresponding optimal prices that would lead to that
particular segmentation outcome while maximizing the manufacturer’s profit.
Note that VNN [θ] − VNP [θ], VNP [θ] − VNH [θ] and VNH [θ] − VLL[θ] are all increas-
ing functions of θ, therefore, consumers in the NN, NP, NH and LL segments have
decreasing θ values. We proceed with the analysis by distinguishing two cases.
Case I: When δ(1 + 1
2
s) > 1.
In this case VNP [θ] − VPP [θ] and VPP [θ] − VNH [θ] are also increasing functions of θ,
so the θ value of consumers in the PP segment lies between those in the NP and NH
segments. Depending on the new and used product prices, all the possible market
segmentation outcomes are as follows (segments are shown in decreasing order of θ):
(i) NN, NP, PP, NH, LL, II; or
(ii) NN, NP, PP, LL, II; or
(iii) NN, PP, NH, LL, II; or
(iv) NN, PP, LL, II.
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We demonstrate the solution process for Subcase (i). For the market to be seg-
mented as in this case, it means ∃θTsδ11 , θTsδ12 , θTsδ13 , θTsδ14 , θTsδ15 such that a consumer
of type θ chooses (1) NN, for θ ∈ (θTsδ11 , 1); (2) NP, for θ ∈ (θTsδ12 , θTsδ11 ]; (3) PP, for
θ ∈ (θTsδ13 , θTsδ12 ]; (4) NH, for θ ∈ (θTsδ14 , θTsδ13 ]; (5) LL, for θ ∈ [θTsδ15 , θTsδ14 ]; (5) II,
for θ ∈ (0, θTsδ15 ].
As a result, the segment sizes of NN, NP, PP, NH, LL and II will be sgNN =
1 − θTsδ11 , sgNP = θTsδ11 − θTsδ12 , sgPP = θTsδ12 − θTsδ13 , sgNH = θTsδ13 − θTsδ14 ,
sgLL = θTsδ14 − θTsδ15 and sgII = θTsδ15 , respectively.
For the used product trades, there are three associated prices, pp, pl and pu. pp
and pl are the prices for reselling peaches and lemons, repectively; and pu is now the
acquisition price for the manufacturer to acquire the used units from the consumers.
Theoretically, the manufacturer sets pp and pl while pu is endogenously determined by
the market such that supply and demand of used products are balanced. Specifically,
the market clearing conditions are:
sgNN(α) = sgPP , (2)
sgNN(1 − α) + sgNP 1 − α
1 + α
= sgLL. (3)
Satisfying these conditions to ensure both peaches and lemons are cleared from the
market imposes two constraints, so effectively the manufacturer can only set one of the
three used product price. Since it is mathematically equivalent to choose any one of
the three used product prices as the decision variable for the manufacturer, we choose
pp as the decision variable for the manufacturer. Then the other two prices (i.e., pl and
pu) will be determined by (i) the proportional relation between lemons and peaches,
and (ii) the demand and supply of used products are always balanced; i.e., pl and pu
can be solved from Equation (2) &(3). The manufacturer profit that comes from the
trade of used products will be ΠTsδ1used = (sgPP )pp+(sgLL)pl−(sgNN +sgNP 1−α1+α)pu,
with the first two terms showing the sales revenue from peaches and lemons, while
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the last one summarizing the total cost to acquire all the used items.
On the other hand, the manufacturer profit that comes from selling new products
will be ΠTsδ1new = sgNN(pt − c) + sgNP (1−α1+α(pt − c) + α1+α(p − c)) + sgNH 12(p − c),
because in every period in expectation, the following consumers will be buying a new
product with trade-in and generate a profit margin of (pt − c) for the manufacturer:
(i) the entire NN segment, and (ii) 1−α
1+α
fraction of the NP segment; and the following
consumers will be buying a new product without trade-in and generate a profit margin
of (p−c) for the manufacturer: (i) α
1+α
fraction of the NP segment, and (ii) the entire
NH segment.




ΠTsδ1 = ΠTsδ1new + Π
Tsδ1
used
subject to sgNN, sgNP, sgPP, sgNH, sgLL, sgII ≥ 0, p− pt ≥ 0.
After substituting the previous results of pl, pu and all the segment sizes into
the equation, we apply the standard Lagragian approach to solve this constrained
optimization problem for the manufacturer profit ΠTsδ1 that is maximized at pTsδ1,
pTsδ1t and p
Tsδ1





Other subcases are solved in a similar manner. After solving each one of them,
we compare the respective optimal profits and identify the highest one. Then the
subcase to which the highest profit belongs will be the final optimal solution. The
results are shown as in the proposition.
Case II: When δ(1 + 1
2
s) ≤ 1.
In this case, following similar argument as in Case I above, consumers in the PP
segment have the higher θ value than the NP segment in this case. Hence, all the
possible market segmentation outcomes are
(i) NN, PP, NP, NH, LL, II; or
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(ii) NN, PP, NP, LL, II; or
(iii) NN, PP, NH, LL, II; or
(iv) NN, PP, LL, II.
Then the problem is solved following similar procedure as demonstrated above.
Proof of Proposition 3.7
Following similar argument as in the Proof of Proposition 3.6, we first exhaust all the
possible market segmentation outcomes as shown below.
Case I: When δ(1 + 1
2
s) > 1.
(i) NN, NP, NH, RR, II; or
(ii) NN, NP, RR, II; or
(iii) NN, NH, RR, II; or
(iv) NN, RR, II.
Then we identify the final optimal solution by comparing the optimal profit from each
possible case. following a similar solution procedure as in the Testing case, except for
two differences, which we demonstrate using Subcase (i) as an example.
The first difference is that now with the Remanufacturing strategy, the market
clearing conditions change from that presented by Equation (2) &(3) in the Testing





The manufacturer will set the remanufactured product price pr while the used product
price pu will be endogenously determined by the market based on the market clearing
condition in Equation (4).
The second difference is that, the manufacturer’s profit component from the




)pu, with the first term showing the sales revenue, the second term being
the cost of remanufacturing incurred to the lemons that will be resold, and the last
term summarizing the total cost of acquiring all the used items.
The manufacturer profit that comes from selling new products will be the same




In this case, the manufacturer solves the following maximization problem
max
p,pt,pr
ΠRsδ1 = ΠRsδ1new + Π
Rsδ1
reman,
subject to sgNN, sgNP, sgNH, sgRR, sgII ≥ 0, p− pt ≥ 0.
The entire problem is solved similar to the Testing case above, the final optimal
solution is presented in the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 3.10
Solving for the optimal solution for the manufacturer with the quantity choice is
similar to the case where the quantity choice is absent, except for two differences. The
first one that is the market clearing constraints (Equation (2) & (3)) now becomes
sgNN(α) = sgPP + xTestQ (5)
sgNN(1 − α) + sgNP 1 − α
1 + α
= sgLL + yTestQ (6)
The other difference is that the manufacturer is solving the profit maximization
problem with the additional decision variables xTestQ and yTestQ
max
p,pt,pp,xTestQ,yTestQ
ΠTsQδ1 = ΠTsQδ1new + Π
TsQδ1
used
subject to sgNN, sgNP, sgPP, sgNH, sgLL, sgII ≥ 0, p−pt ≥ 0, 0 ≤ x ≤ sgNN(α),
0 ≤ y ≤ sgNN(1 − α) + sgNP 1−α
1+α
, with the last two constraints ensuring that the
manufacturer does not discard more peaches or lemons than it has on hand.
Incorporating these two changes and then following similar solution procedure as
demonstrated above yields the optimal solution presented in the proposition.
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Proof of Proposition 3.11
Solving this problem is similar to the case of the Remanufacturing strategy without
the quantity choice, whose result presented in Proposition 3.7, with three differences.





sgNP = sgRR + xRQ + yRQ.
In addition, while the composition of the manufacturer profit from selling new
products is the same as before (i.e., ΠRsδ1new = Π
RsδQ1
new ), the one that comes from





)(pu), to account for that the discarded lemons
do not incur remanufacturing cost although all the acquired used products (eventually
discarded or not) incur the unit acquisition cost pu.
Finally, the profit maximization problem for the manufacturer now has embedded
with two additional decision variables:
max
p,pt,pr,xRQ,yRQ
= ΠRsδQ1new + Π
RsδQ1
reman,
subject to sgNN, sgNP, sgNH, sgRR, sgII ≥ 0, p − pt ≥ 0, 0 ≤ x ≤ (α)sgNN ,
0 ≤ y ≤ sgNN(1 − α) + sgNP 1−α
1+α
. Then we solve the problem following similar
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